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ABSTRACT 
 
Intercollegiate Athletics and Escalation of Commitment. (May 2011) 
Frank Adrien Bouchet, B.S., Auburn University; 
M.S., Arizona State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Vicente Lechuga 
 
 This dissertation provides an overview of the history of intercollegiate athletics 
through the lens of escalation of commitment theory, a framework that has been used 
primarily in business and public policy literature. The dissertation is comprised of three 
case studies that reflect the direction that different college or universities have chosen to 
take regarding their athletic programs. This dissertation explores the literature regarding 
escalation of commitment and its impact on college athletics. Contributing to the paper 
is a focus on the financial contributions colleges and universities continue to make in 
their athletic programs despite evidence that these resources are not being rewarded. The 
papers hypothesizes that both external and internal pressures play a key role in the 
investments that college and universities are making in their Division I athletic 
programs. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Intercollegiate Athletics and Escalation of Commitment 
 Throughout history, powerful people have found themselves locked into courses of 
action and situations that initially seemed lucrative; however, as time progressed, these 
actions and situations proved to be most imprudent. Yet these people remained intent on 
their commitment to their original courses of action instead of seeking a new direction. 
The term for this situation has become known as escalation of commitment (Staw, 1976; 
Staw & Ross, 1989). Essentially, people will rationalize their decisions and find ways to 
justify their continued commitment to losing courses of action, which then ultimately 
leads them to become trapped in these losing situations as a result of their earlier 
decisions (Staw, 1976; Drummond 1994). 
 To illustrate, escalation of commitment theory has been used to suggest one city‟s 
continued expensive and failing initiatives for bolstering its local infrastructure. As 
reported in a 1979 article in Time Magazine entitled Money Down the Drain,  
A city spends a large amount of money to improve its sewer and drainage 
system. The project is the largest public works project in the nation and involves 
digging 131 miles of tunnel shafts, reservoirs, and pumping stations. The 
excavation is only 10 percent completed and is useless until it is totally finished. 
The project will take the next 20 years to complete and will cost $11 billion. 
Unfortunately, the deep the tunnels go, the more money they cost and the greater 
are the questions about the wisdom of the entire venture (Staw, 1981, pg. 577). 
 
Granted, there were likely many other factors influencing the local government‟s 
decision to continue with this project; however, this example illustrates the point that  
______________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Sport Management. 
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some of the more incomprehensible political and business based decisions have been the 
result of escalating commitments (Staw, 1981). 
 Variations of escalation of commitment theory abound in different academic sectors.  
Organization behaviorists often refer to variations of this theory as job embeddedness 
(Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, Sablynski, & Erez, 2001). In social psychology literature, many 
studies have been conducted regarding the phenomenon of “entrapment” (Brockner & 
Rubin, 1985).  Tegear (1980) has published literature in conflict resolution concerning 
the rationale of “too much invested to quit”. Behavioral economists discuss the effects of 
“sunk costs” (Knox & Inkster, 1969; Sutton, 1991). With these various derivations of 
escalation of commitment theory, the lingering question remains: when should one get 
out of a situation that clearly is no longer advantageous? 
 One area in which escalation of commitment theory could be useful in explaining 
events is the institution of sport.  Recent financial data from 119 NCAA Division I 
athletic departments indicates that only 25 of these athletic departments were financially 
profitable in 2008 (Fulks, 2009), meaning their revenues did not cover their expenses. 
The majority of university athletic departments are continually running large financial 
deficits.  The constant pressures of producing winning athletic teams and gaining more 
exposure for the universities has led to an influx of spending by the athletic departments 
(Fulks, 2009). However, it would appear that many athletic programs may discover that 
they have fallen into scenarios of escalation.  Many universities pour millions of dollars 
into their athletic programs with the naïve hope that their athletic teams will somehow be 
able to compete at the highest levels and earn a return on their investment. 
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 Through this chapter, and the subsequent articles, I examine intercollegiate athletics 
utilizing escalation of commitment as an epistemological lens to shed light on the 
circumstances occurring in intercollegiate athletics. I explain the tenets of escalation of 
commitment and outline the research methods used to collect and analyze data for the 
subsequent three articles. I explore the historical development of intercollegiate athletics 
to demonstrate how universities have fallen into the cycle of escalation and apply 
escalation of commitment to the events transpiring in intercollegiate athletics. Finally, I 
offer three case studies that highlight both escalation and de-escalation phenomena in a 
higher education setting. 
Escalation of Commitment Theory 
 Escalation of commitment is a theory that states that it is expected that organizations 
will reverse decisions which result in negative consequences (Staw, 1976). Or as 
Drummond (1994) notes “escalation is defined as a situation in which costs are incurred, 
negative feedback is received, where there is an opportunity to withdraw or persistence 
are uncertain (p. 592).” In lay terms, when people continue to persist in the face of 
negative feedback they are in an escalating situation. 
Determinants of Escalation 
 Project determinants are generally the objective economic aspects of the project or 
situation that are the most obvious factors of remaining in a course of action (Staw & 
Ross, 1989; Drummond, 1994). Essentially, project factors concern primarily the 
perceived costs and benefits of continuing a project onto its completion (Drummond, 
1994). These variables include possible future profits of the project along with the 
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amount of investments needed to achieve a profitable margin on the project as well 
(Ross & Staw, 1986). Therefore, it is apparent that the economic structure of a project 
can play a part in the determination of whether or not individuals choose to stay in 
situations (Ross & Staw, 1986). 
 Psychological determinants tend to be more abstract than project determinants, yet 
they still have a decided effect on the decisions of individuals that lead to escalation. 
Examples of psychological factors include the difficulty of withdrawing from a 
previously rewarded activity; individual motivations such as the need for self-
justification; decision making errors such as trying to recoup resources already invested 
in the project (known as sunk costs); and biases in information processing such as 
tendencies to slant data in the direction of pre-existing beliefs (Ross & Staw, 1986; Staw 
& Ross, 1989; Drummond, 1994). As Staw (as cited in Ross & Staw, 1986) explains, 
individuals who are responsible for initial funding decisions of a project tend to become 
more psychologically attached to the project even in face of the impending losses that 
are suffered. 
 Social determinants are the interpersonal processes that may lead to excess 
commitment.  Often, persistence with a losing course of action becomes a situation of 
maintaining social status by not admitting mistakes which would then ultimately result 
in the loss of the individual‟s credibility in social sectors (Ross & Staw, 1986; Staw & 
Ross, 1989; Drummond, 1994).  Succinctly stated, “administrators may persist in a 
course of action, not just because they do not want to admit a mistake to themselves, but 
because they hesitate to expose their errors to others” (Ross & Staw, 1986, p. 217). 
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 Finally, structural or organization determinants are the continued commitments of 
entire organizations to the projects or situations (Ross & Staw, 1986; Staw & Ross, 
1989; Drummond, 1994). Eventually, as projects continue to grow, the aforementioned 
individual determinants begin to subside and the persistence of individuals evolves into 
organizational commitment to the project (Drummond, 1994). Political forces on and 
public perceptions of the organization also factor into the organization‟s willingness to 
continue in losing directions (Ross & Staw, 1986). 
 Escalation of commitment theory has been used primarily in the study of foreign 
policy situations and in the study of management (Allison, 1971; Staw, 1976; Ross & 
Staw, 1986).  However, escalation of commitment has received little or no attention in 
the field of sport management.  Accordingly, I will examine the history of intercollegiate 
athletics in order to illustrate the evolution of intercollegiate athletics and escalation of 
commitment theory to demonstrate how universities and athletic departments can find 
themselves in situations of escalation. 
History of Escalation within Intercollegiate Athletics 
 Colleges in the United States have participated in athletics since the mid 1800s. The 
first intercollegiate competition was a crew race between Harvard and Yale in 1852 
(Barr, 2008). These first contests between universities were run primarily by the students 
from the participating schools. As the pressure to win these athletic events continued to 
increase, it became apparent to the students that they would need outside help in order to 
be better equipped for the competitions. This led to Yale hiring William Wood in 1864 
to be the first intercollegiate athletic coach (Barr, 2008). 
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 The late 1800s and early 1900s saw a tremendous growth in intercollegiate athletics.  
Steadily, intercollegiate athletics blossomed into a major part of American life. Though 
collegiate athletics were also present in English and German universities during this time 
period, intercollegiate athletics in the United States had already begun to experience 
commercialization (Cohen, 1998). Whether built through donations or funded through 
deficit financing, the large scale football stadiums at California, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, and Yale (which are still in use today) were built in the 1920s (Cohen, 1998). 
 As these contests became increasingly more competitive, the dangerous nature of 
football and illegal student participation forced faculty and campus administrators to find 
ways to govern and regulate athletic contests.  This led to the formation of two 
organizations that would forever change the scope of intercollegiate athletics. The first 
was the formation of the Big Ten Conference in 1895 (Barr, 2008). The conference, 
which was comprised of large public Midwestern universities, was formed to create 
student eligibility rules.  The second change was the formation of the Intercollegiate 
Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS) in 1905 which was established in 
order to increase safety in the game of football (Barr, 2008). Eventually, in 1912 this 
organization changed its name to the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
(Barr, 2008). 
 The growth of intercollegiate athletics did not come without costs.  In 1929, the 
Carnegie Foundation commissioned Dr. Howard Savage to conduct a study that 
ultimately painted a bleak picture of intercollegiate athletics in the U.S. (Barr, 2008).  
Savage and his coauthors discovered that there was an increase in commercialization in 
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intercollegiate athletics, leading to problems such as recruiting abuses, academic abuses, 
and even monetary payments to athletes (Barr, 2008; Thelin, 1994). From these findings, 
the NCAA began to change its mission into an organization that oversees academic 
standards, monitors recruiting, and establishes principles to govern amateurism in 
intercollegiate athletics (Lawrence, 1987). Sixty years later, the Knight Foundation 
conducted a similar study which found that many of these same problems still existed 
(Barr, 2008). 
 In 1948, representatives from all the major conferences met in Chicago to discuss 
both the effects that the end of World War II would have on college athletics and to 
discuss the need for all schools to abide by NCAA rules (Lawrence, 1987). The 
guidelines for intercollegiate athletics that came out of the Chicago meeting were sent to 
all major universities for review (Barr, 2008). The guidelines set forth by this meeting 
were coined as the Sanity Code, as it was believed that the five principles outlined would 
return a level of sanity back to intercollegiate athletics (Lawrence, 1987).  The efforts 
that came out of the Sanity Code were the strongest efforts of the NCAA to date 
regarding the regulation of the amount of financial aid universities could offer student-
athletes (Lawrence, 1987). Eventually, the Sanity Code was overturned in favor of 
individual enforcement by each individual school in the NCAA (Lawrence, 1987). It 
could be argued that over the years the NCAA‟s inability to sanction individual schools 
and certain schools‟ reluctance to adhere to the tenets of the Sanity Code was one of the 
initial factors that have led to escalation in intercollegiate athletics. 
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 Intercollegiate athletics continued to evolve and expand throughout the mid 1900s. 
Football in particular began to incorporate new ideas and strategies that helped shape the 
game into the game we see played today. Until the 1960s, intercollegiate football was 
played as a one-platoon game where the student-athletes were responsible for playing on 
both the offensive and defensive side of the ball (Byers, 1995). Playing football with a 
single platoon was economically advantageous because the costs associated with fielding 
football teams were considerably low (Byers, 1995). However, the growing influence of 
coaches began to take intercollegiate football in another, less economically efficient 
direction. Aggressive and forward thinking younger coaches in the 1950s began to push 
for a two-platoon game of football, and this system of football was finally instituted in 
1965 (Byers, 1995). In reflection of this institutional change in intercollegiate football, 
Byers noted that this “was corporate and bureaucratic America at work: a head coach, 
offensive and defensive coordinators, position coaches, special teams coaches, and 
plenty of recruiting coaches” (p. 99). This move began the escalation of the costs of 
intercollegiate athletics and further served to put private schools at a disadvantage 
against large public universities (Byers, 1995). As a result of these rising costs, it was 
becoming increasingly more apparent that schools would need to pursue other sources of 
revenue. 
 Increasingly, this source would become television (Byers, 1995). While television 
has been a mainstay in college athletics for decades, it reached a tipping point in the 
early 1980s (Byers, 1995; Goff & Ashwell, 2008). Prior to 1981, television deals were 
negotiated entirely by the NCAA; but in 1982, realizing the potential money that they 
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were missing out on, large universities formed a coalition and sued the NCAA for the 
rights to negotiate their own television contracts (Goff & Ashwell, 2008).  This lawsuit 
eventually was heard by the Supreme Court.  Citing anti-trust laws, the Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of the universities, which allowed the universities to negotiate their own 
television contracts (Byers, 1995; Goff & Ashwell, 2008).  This Supreme Court ruling 
opened the floodgates for schools and conferences to begin individually negotiating their 
own television contracts. 
 Soon after universities began to negotiate their own television contracts, the Knight 
Commission, similar to the aforementioned Carnegie Foundation, was charged with once 
again examining intercollegiate athletics (Barr, 2008). After 10 years of reports, the 
Knight Commission observed that many of the same problems discovered by the 
Carnegie Foundation still existed in intercollegiate athletics (Barr, 2008; Byers, 1995; 
Knight Commission, 1991; Knight Commission, 2001). The reports of the Knight 
Commission suggested that the presidents of the universities take control of the athletic 
programs in order to address academic issues and reign in spending (Knight 
Commission, 2001; Barr, 2008). As a result of these reports, the NCAA began to pass 
numerous rules in order police the practices of their member institutions; however, it is 
debatable whether increased presidential control over the athletic programs and these 
new rules have truly improved the landscape of intercollegiate athletics (Barr, 2008). 
 The increased commercialization of intercollegiate athletics has become highly 
problematic for universities (Barr, 2008; Byers, 1995).  In his autobiography entitled 
Unsportsmanlike Conduct, former Executive Director of the NCAA Walter Byers 
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highlighted the escalation of commercialization in intercollegiate athletics (see Byers, 
1995). Byers suggested that university athletic departments were duplicating the 
business practices of large-scale corporations though they were operating under the 
umbrella of non-profit status. Conferences and universities were developing into market 
powers, competing for television rights for football and basketball games (Byers, 1995; 
Goff & Ashwell, 2008). This race to secure broadcasting rights led to the expansion of 
all of the major conferences further increasing the gaps between the those schools with 
higher budgets for athletics from those with lesser money to spend for athletic 
competition (Byers, 1995). 
 Eventually, as Byers outlines, the culmination of this came with the formation of the 
Bowl Championship Series (BCS) in 1992. The BCS was a partnership between the top 
six athletic conferences, three bowls (Orange, Rose, Fiesta), and network television. This 
effectively delineated the resources from the BCS conferences schools and the non-BCS 
schools.  BCS schools began to see immediate payoffs from these partnerships that 
afforded them with the budgets to improve their facilities, raise coaches‟ salaries, and 
increase media exposure (Byers, 1995). To compete with the BCS schools, non-BCS 
schools to this day continually seek to find new ways in which increase their exposure 
and notoriety. 
 The goal at the start of this research was to examine three schools that have chosen 
different paths regarding intercollegiate athletics. Each of the schools explored in this 
dissertation chose a path that was different in direction but ultimately represented what 
campus administrators thought was the best direction for the institution. 
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 Considering the embedded culture that has permeated intercollegiate athletics, 
stopping and reversing escalation of commitment is likely an arduous task (Beyer & 
Hannah, 2000). Many scholars have alluded to the idea that a mentality of “win at all 
costs” has become the moniker for many athletic programs (see Beyer & Hannah, 2000; 
Baxter & Lambert, 1990).  Universities and athletic departments across the country have 
increasingly adopted the belief that winning requires increased financial commitment to 
athletics. Thus, many intercollegiate athletic programs may have found themselves thrust 
into a situation of escalation. With the limited financial resources of many universities, 
perhaps some of these institutions may simply be throwing good money after bad. 
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CHAPTER II 
A CASE SUDY OF INSTITUTIONAL BRANDING AT S.M.U. 
 The decision on where to position a university‟s athletic department, either within 
the various NCAA Division classification (e. g. Division I, Division II, etc.) or regional 
athletic conference affiliations, is one that college administrators have faced for years. 
Because of the rising costs of operating an athletic department at the Division I level, 
this decision is exacerbated at small, private schools that choose to continue competition 
in this classification. As the potential stakes for participating in Division I athletics 
continue to grow, university administrators at these private institutions are faced with 
important decisions regarding the direction of their athletic programs (Roy, Graeff, & 
Harmon, 2008). 
 As is often the case at both public and private schools, if athletic department 
revenues do not match their expenses they are forced to borrow money from the 
university‟s central fund. This forces the university to divert dollars that could be spent 
on academic or other student-related endeavors to the athletic department. Since most 
institutions of higher learning define their mission as one of academic excellence, this 
redistribution of money to athletics is often at odds with a university‟s central mission. 
Beyer & Hannah (2000) argue that “academic and athletic programs have long been seen 
as in competition for resources on American college campuses” (p. 105). Indeed, in the 
case study described herein, Southern Methodist University‟s Centennial Strategic Plan 
2006-2015 lists five main goals that the university should work towards in the coming 
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decade. Academic benchmarks comprise the first three goals, while athletics is briefly 
discussed in goal four. 
 From the athletic department perspective, the money spent on athletics benefits the 
university as a whole. Because of the increased media exposure on college athletics it is 
increasingly important that universities use their athletic programs to help define how 
the school is viewed by external and internal parties (Goff, 2000). The schools that have 
embraced this strategy have adopted a philosophy which uses the media to promote 
athletics as a front porch of the university (Roy, Greaff, & Harmon, 2008). In essence, 
they are using this opportunity to brand their institutions. Recent history shows that 
schools that choose not to make a financial investment in their athletic programs risk the 
stigma of branding the school as one that does not take athletics seriously (Roy, Graeff, 
& Harmon, 2008). 
 This case study will examine Southern Methodist University and the school‟s 
escalating spending on college athletics. Unlike other small, non-BCS, private 
universities (e.g., Tulane, Rice, and The University of Tulsa) that have chosen to 
compete at the Division I level without large cash investments, this study will 
demonstrate that SMU has chosen to take a different route in competing at the Division I 
level. As such, the criteria for selecting an institution consisted of finding a non-BCS 
school that not only participated at the Division I classification but that had increased 
expenditures greatly on both their athletic programs and facilities in a given time period. 
It was essential that the institution be a non-BCS school because those schools, unlike 
BCS members, have little hope of recouping their investment through television 
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revenues. The study will focus on the schools decision to embark upon a massive 
financial commitment to its athletic department. These financial commitments have 
mainly come in the form of what campus administrators call soft costs (the university 
covering the cost of scholarships) and hard costs (increased coach‟s salaries and the 
building new athletic facilities). 
 This paper will begin by providing readers with an overview of college athletics and 
its place in the university. It will then move into a discussion about both the literature 
involving escalation of commitment theory and institutional branding before outlining 
the problem statement, research questions and methodology. Next, a case study of SMU 
and its struggle regarding escalation within the athletic department will be presented. 
This will be followed by an exploration of the central themes gathered from the data and 
a thorough analysis of how the escalation theory ties into the data. After an analysis of 
the findings the paper will conclude by providing the reader with some ideas involving 
this theory and its application to intercollegiate athletics, particularly to small, private 
universities that continue Division I participation. 
Athletics as a Marketing Platform 
 While professional sports tend to be national in scope almost all college athletic 
programs, with the exception of a handful of institutions, focus on a local or regional 
audience. However, with the advent of technology, college athletics is gradually moved 
away from its regional roots to a more national scope (Sperber, 2000). With this national 
platform the question of how a university positions its college athletic teams has taken 
on a greater importance. The term – positions - refers to the “part of a brand‟s identity 
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communicated to create an understanding in the target audience‟s mind of what the 
brand should mean to them” (Roy, Graeff, & Harmon, 2008; Aaker, 1996). In the 
context of this study, position refers to how people view the university through the 
image of the institutions athletic teams.  As an example, the University of Texas at San 
Antonio has recently petitioned the NCAA to add a Football Championship Subdivision 
team to its athletic program. The Football Championship Subdivision operates one rung 
below the NCAA‟s highest classification, the Football Bowl Subdivision. This was done, 
in part, to better position the school as a national research university (Stephens, 2009). 
 Roy, Graeff, & Harmon (2008) state that college athletics are instrumental in shaping 
institutional image, the image of its students and graduates; and building bonds of 
community among supporters (Beyer & Hannah, 2000; Frey, 1985; Shulman & Bowen, 
2001). This is especially true at Division I institutions where there is increased media 
exposure. Roy, Graeff, & Harmon (2008) continue by noting that even scholars who are 
skeptical that athletic programs can produce a positive financial impact on institutions, 
either directly or indirectly understand the value of athletics as a vehicle to brand the 
university (e.g., Frank, 2004; Sperber, 2000; Zimbalist, 1999). Given the increased 
importance that institutions place on student enrollment and fundraising how these 
universities market their services through their athletic departments have taken a greater 
importance (Roy, Graeff, & Harmon, 2008). 
 University administrators initiate branding campaigns to distinguish their schools 
from peer institutions and make them more attractive to constituents. Since athletics are 
often the most visible aspect of a university and also serve as a common dominator 
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among schools they are often a part of these branding initiatives. As an example of 
athletics role in generating publicity for a university Goff (2000) notes that in 1992, 
Northwestern University athletics accounted for almost 70% of the media coverage of 
the university while research and academic related articles accounted for less than 5%.   
However, this increase in marketability comes with an increased financial commitment. 
This financial commitment has caused university administrators to ask “if expenditures 
exceed revenues in most college athletic programs, why are universities investing so 
much more each year in these programs” (Frank, 2004)? Accordingly, university 
administrators at smaller, private schools that participate in Division I athletics are 
reevaluating the direction of their programs (e.g., Tulane report, 2003 Rice report, 2004). 
Problem Statement 
 The amount of financial resources universities are devoting to athletics has never 
been greater (Fulks, 2009). Schools are under tremendous pressure to field competitive 
athletic teams. This pressure to increase athletic spending, and thus keep up with their 
peer institutions, comes from various stakeholders. Often, the stakeholders represent 
external constituencies of the university. This course of action has resulted in an 
escalation in spending among athletic departments (Fulks, 2009). 
 Often, this spending by athletic departments has led to deficits that have been 
augmented by university finances (Hearn, 2002). At SMU, one interviewee noted that 
the university has subsidized a portion of the athletic department budget for as long as he 
could remember. “If the full cost of athletic facilities – including construction and 
operation – were assessed fully to the athletic department, no athletic program in the 
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nation would be solvent” (Hearn, 2002 p.4). The athletic departments that did not cover 
their expenses received outside support from either university funds or sources directly 
associated with the university (alumni) to make up for the shortfall (Perko, 2009). This 
support is given in a number of ways. 
Athletic Department Funding 
 The most common method of support for athletic departments that cannot cover their 
expenses comes from university funds (Perko, 2009). This comes in the form of the 
university taking money from its central operating budget and transferring that money to 
the athletic department. In effect, the university is providing a direct subsidy to the 
athletic department. This subsidy comes at a time when university‟s finances are strained 
due to budget cuts. These budget cuts often affect the funding of academic programs 
(Waugh, 2009; Mattox, 2009). Another way an athletic department receives help via the 
university is through an increase in student fees (Thomas, 2009). This simply means 
increasing the amount of money that the students pay in addition to tuition. The increase 
in student fees dedicated to athletics is added to ever increasing student fees for various 
programs offered by the school. With tuition increasing at alarming rates, university 
administrators are leery of increasing the financial burden paid by students (Perko, 
2009). 
 The primary functions of a university are the development of an informed citizenry 
and skilled workforce. Many people feel the excess money spent on athletics could be 
better spent on academic programs, research, student development, community outreach, 
etc. that are more related to the institution‟s mission (Hearn, 2002). Most universities are 
18 
 
willing to field competitive Division I athletic programs as long as it is not a strain on 
university budgets (Duderstadt, 2003). When these athletic programs consistently need 
university funds to remain solvent it creates unwanted attention from internal university 
stakeholders. These internal stakeholders include faculty, administrators, and students 
who believe money given to athletics could be used for deferred maintenance, faculty 
raises, and student recruitment. 
 These internal stakeholders have recently spoken out regarding the escalating 
situation in college athletics. In a speech to the Association of Governing Bodies Wake 
Forest University President Thomas Hearn (2002) stated “the resulting spiral of 
escalating costs chasing escalating revenues leads to abuses of every sort (p.5).” This is a 
feeling held by many campus administrators (Hearn, 2002). Logically, one might expect 
behavior in escalation situations to follow a progress akin to conventional economic 
decision making (Ross & Staw, 1986 p. 274). People tend to keep doing things that 
work, and stop doing things that don‟t work. Conventional wisdom states that “when an 
individual has a declining investment, a faulting career, or even a troubled marriage, 
there is often the difficult choice between putting greater effort into the present line of 
behavior versus seeking a new alternative (Staw & Ross, 1989).” This does not 
necessarily hold true in college athletics. Because of the increasing media coverage 
devoted to college athletics, universities often spend large amounts of money on their 
athletic programs with the intent of better branding their institution. This money is spent 
with little hope of ever recouping their investment. This case study will explore how one 
private university has dealt with an escalation situation involving athlet 
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Research Questions 
 The following questions were used to guide data collection and focus this paper on 
certain themes. 
1) What are the factors that influenced SMU‟s decision to make long-term 
investments in its athletic program? 
2) How does the notion of “institutional branding” influence the institution‟s 
decisions to invest in their athletics programs? 
3) What role does the internal and external environment play in the institutions 
decision to continue investing in their athletic programs even after their current 
investments did not succeed in meeting university expectations? 
Literature Review and Study Design 
 Escalation of Commitment is a theory developed by Barry Staw (1976) that 
primarily states that in many instances individuals (and organizations) can become 
locked into a costly course of action and are unwilling to change that course. Staw 
(1981) demonstrated that when individuals were personally responsible for a failing 
course of action, they often increased their investment instead of withdrawing and 
accepting a loss (Ross, 2003). The basic tenants of this theory are that “one would expect 
individuals to reverse decisions or to change behaviors which result in negative 
consequences (Staw, 1976 p.27)” and that rationale or self-justification plays an 
important role in the decision making process that led to the escalation (Staw, 1976). As 
management scholar Helga Drummund succinctly states “persistence in the face of a 
stream of losses is known as escalation (Drummond, 1996 p.1).” 
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 In the seminal article about escalation of commitment Barry Staw (1976;  1981) 
gives two examples that will serve to put escalation of commitment theory in context. 
The first example deals with the Vietnam War as it relates to governmental policy 
making. Former Under Secretary of State George Ball describes his observations 
regarding some costly resources related decisions involving the United States 
involvement in Indochina: 
Once large numbers of U. S. troops are committed to direct combat, they will 
begin to take heavy casualties  in a war they are ill equipped to fight in a non-
cooperative if not downright hostile countryside. Once we suffer large casualties, 
we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so 
great that we cannot – without national humiliation – stop short of achieving our 
complete objectives. Of the two possibilities, I think humiliation would be more 
likely than the achievement of our objectives – even after we have paid terrible 
costs. (Memo from George Ball to President Lyndon Johnson, July, 1965; 
source: The Pentagon Papers, 1971). 
 
The second example deals with an individual that invests money in the stock market. In 
this example, an individual is forced to confront a decision. Does this individual 
continue investing in a stock that is clearly going down or does the individual cut their 
losses: 
An individual purchased a stock at $50 a share, but the price has gone down to 
$20. Still, convinced about the merit of the stock, he buys more shares at this 
lower price. Soon the price declines further and the individual is again faced with 
the decision to buy more, hold what he already has, or sell out entirely (Staw, 
1981, p.577). 
 
These examples, while taking into account that many factors influence any one decision 
(especially sending the military into war), illustrate that decision making can be 
influenced by the reluctance of individuals to admit past mistakes or the need to justify 
prior behavior (Staw, 1976). However, these examples also indicate that often 
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individuals (and organizations) can lose sight of the larger picture when making 
decisions. 
Determinants of Escalation 
 Staw and Ross (1987) have characterized escalation as a four part process consisting 
of four determinants. Each of one of these determinates – project, psychological, social, 
and institutional – play a vital role within the escalation process. Staw and Ross (1987) 
continue by further defining each determinant. By breaking down the process, Staw and 
Ross (1987) demonstrate that it is possible for small individual factors to lead to an 
escalation scenario. 
 Project determinants. Under this rubric are objective aspects of a project, such as 
its closing costs, its salvage value, the cause of the setbacks to its completion, and the 
economic merits of pursuing or dropping it. This determinant involves assessing the 
economic prospects on many variables of a certain project decades into the future (Ross 
& Staw, 1993). Research by Northcraft & Neale (1986) has found that accurate financial 
information may be necessary for decision makers to withdraw from a losing course of 
action (Ross & Staw, 1993). Often times not being able to estimate the costs of a project 
makes it difficult for decision makers to withdraw. 
 Psychological determinants. This category includes “reinforcement traps” (Platt, 
1973), such as difficulties in withdrawing from a previously rewarded activity; 
individual motivations, such as the need for self-justification; decision making errors, 
such as trying to recoup “sunk costs” (resources already invested in a project); and 
biases in information processing, such as tendencies to slant data in the direction of 
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preexisting beliefs. As Nisbett and Ross (1980) summarized, people have an almost 
uncanny ability to bias facts in the direction of previously accepted beliefs and 
preferences (Ross & Staw, 1993) Staw & Ross (1993) also note that people are much 
more likely to attribute negative outcomes to external than to internal causes.   
 Social determinants. Included here are interpersonal processes that may lead to 
excess commitment, such as the desires to justify losing projects to potentially hostile 
audiences (Fox & Staw, 1979), modeling others‟ behavior in similar circumstances 
(Brockner, Rubin, & Lang, 1981), and cultural norms favoring consistent, or strong 
leadership (Staw & Ross, 1980). In lay terms social determinants refers to the 
unwillingness to lose credibility in the face of unexpected losses. “Decision makers may 
persist in a course of action not only because they do not want to admit to themselves 
that they have made a mistake, but because they may also be especially hesitant to 
expose their errors to others (Ross & Staw, 1986).”  By withdrawing their athletic 
programs from NCAA Division I status a university might lose credibility with their 
alumni, students, peer institutions, and certainly, the media. 
 Organizational determinants. Under this category come such variables as the level 
of public support for a project within an organization (Pfeffer, 1981), the level of 
economic and technical “side-bets”, which are defined as additional investments 
incurred by the organization with respect to the project (hiring of staff, development of 
expertise) (March,1978), and the extent of the project‟s institutionalization within the 
organization – how tied it is to the firm‟s values and objectives (Goodman, Bazerman, & 
Conlon, 1980). An example of a side-bet involving athletics might be how universities 
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currently use their athletic programs as a marketing vehicle for the school instead of the 
original intent which was to serve as student sponsored competitions.   
 Contextual determinants. While not a part of Ross and Staw‟s (1993) a priori 
model, contextual determinants play a key role in this case study. As typical in 
discussions regarding universities and outside influences, the forces that extend beyond 
the school‟s boundaries typically are explored. This is especially true when discussing 
athletic departments at Division I institutions. An athletic department has many 
stakeholders with varying degrees of influence. One could argue that the athletic 
department is a microcosm of the university. Both are organizations that have to operate 
among social, political, and media forces. This particular institution discussed in this 
study has wedded its athletic department with the larger external forces that shape 
Division I athletics in this country. 
Utilizing Escalation of Commitment 
 Escalation of Commitment theory has been used primarily in both public policy 
literature to describe how governments become engaged in escalating situations as well 
as strategic management literature to describe certain business situations that effect for 
profit firms (Alison, 1971, Staw, 1976, Ross & Staw, 1986). The escalation concept has 
proved popular because it provides a grounded behavioral science explanation for an 
otherwise difficult to understand, commonly observable reality, individual and 
organizations often keep investing resources in failing endeavors (Ross, 2003), such as 
the behaviors associated with continuing and increasing investments by universities in 
under-achieving athletic programs. “Because it is often possible for persons (or 
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institutions) who have suffered a setback to recoup their losses through an even greater 
commitment of resources to the same course of action, a cycle of escalating commitment 
can be produced (Staw, 1981 p.577).”  This study will attempt to mesh this theory into 
current situations in which many institutions of higher learning find themselves in 
regarding college athletics. 
 Variations of this theory abound in both academia and everyday life. Organizational 
behaviorists refer to this theory as job embeddedness (Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, Sablynski, 
& Erez, 2001). Scholars use the term job embeddedness to argue that individuals tend to 
remain in organizations because they feel connected to a social web. In social 
psychology literature much research has been written regarding the phenomena of 
“entrapment” (Brockner & Rubin, 1985). Allen Teger (1980) has published literature in 
conflict resolution that revolves around “to much invested to quit” rationale. This 
rationale simply states that the more time, money, and effort one puts into any endeavor 
the tougher it is to quit. 
 The behavioral economics literature discusses the effects of “sunk costs” (Knox & 
Inkster, 1969, Sutton, 1991). Sunk cost is defined as a past cost which has already been 
spent and thus can not be recovered. Everyday lay terminology refers to “throwing good 
money after bad” to describe a situation in which one continues down a path of 
escalation despite negative consequences. These theories attempt to address the question 
of when should one get out of a situation that clearly is no longer advantageous. Since 
escalation of commitment has been used as an organizationally based theory it is the 
most appropriate for this study. In this paper I will attempt to tie the theory of escalation 
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into what is happening in a small, private, school‟s athletic department. Central to the 
escalation theme will be the subject of institutional branding and its effects on increased 
spending. 
Institutional Branding 
 How a university presents itself to the external environment is important. 
Increasingly, universities are making a concerted effort to focus on developing a brand 
identity (Roy, Graeff, & Harmon, 2008), which is defined as an organizations “unique 
set of associations that the brand strategist aspires to create or maintain (Aaker 1996. 
p.68).” These associations help the institution effectively convey a predesigned message 
to potential consumers. “Brand identity is composed of associations that the marketer 
attempts to convey through such means as brand name, logo, product attributes, and 
promotional activities (Roy, 1998).” Increasingly, a university‟s athletic programs are 
viewed as way for the school to effectively communicate their message. 
 Within higher education a brand identity is defined as “the essence of how you 
would like alumni, prospective students, legislators, and the public to perceive your 
institution” (Lawlor, 1998, p.19). “Universities have increasingly recognized that 
knowledgeable, prospective students are more likely to process their college choice 
based on the brand of the institution” (Judson, Gorchels, & Aurand 2006 p. 98). This 
brand identity helps the university better position itself in a crowded marketplace. 
 Brand positioning is defined as how potential buyers see the product (Ries & Trout, 
1981) and how marketers create an image for a product. Roy, Greaff, and Harmon 
(2008) define brand positioning as the part of a brand‟s identity actively communicated 
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to create an understanding in the target audience‟s mind of what the brand should mean 
to them (Aaker, 1996). An example of effective brand positioning is the Disney 
Company. Though brand positioning, Disney has defined itself as a company that stands 
for wholesome family entertainment of the utmost quality. However, marketing scholars 
state that brand positioning is only successful if it is properly aligned with an overall 
brand mission of the institution. In the case of many universities across the nation the 
mission is to create an effective brand identity for the school.  Judson, Gorchels, & 
Aurand (2006) continue by stating “many universities have taken intentional steps to 
alter the market position of their institution in order to attract targeted groups of 
prospective students” (p.98). For example, The University of Notre Dame has used the 
popularity of its football program (and the money it‟s generated) to brand the school as 
not only the top Catholic university in the country but also a top academic school. 
College Athletics and Branding 
 Roy, Greaff, and Harmon (2008) note that college athletics has been credited as 
being instrumental in shaping institutional image, the image of its students and 
graduates, and building bonds of community among supporters (Beyer & Hannah, 2000; 
Frey, 1985; Shulman & Bowen, 2001). As higher education moves to a more market 
driven environment it is increasingly important that universities invest in initiatives that 
will promote their brand. “Even scholars who are skeptical whether athletic programs 
can produce a positive financial impact on institutions, either directly or indirectly (e.g., 
Frank, 2004; Sperber, 2000; Zimbalist, 1999), acknowledge the potential for athletics to 
generate exposure for an institution (Roy, Greaff, & Harmon, 2008).” An example of 
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this would be the University of Utah. In both the 2004 and 2008 seasons, the football 
program played in a BCS bowl game which generated an unprecedented amount of 
media coverage for the school. 
 In addition to using a football program to create awareness for an institution and 
shape its image, membership in NCAA Division I-A football can be incorporated into 
the brand positioning strategy for an institution (Roy, Greaff, & Harmon, 2008, p.16)” A 
positioning strategy is essential to communicating an institution‟s identity to 
stakeholders (Roy, Graeff, and Harmon, 2008). Most institutions hope that by 
positioning their athletic teams – either changing NCAA classifications or conference 
membership – it will help better position the school to attract students and increase 
alumni giving. Using athletic programs to better brand the institution was one of the 
primary factors in thirty schools adding football in the last decade (Colon, 2009). One of 
the schools that recently added varsity football was the University of North Carolina -
Charlotte. In announcing the University of North Carolina – Charlotte‟s decision to add 
a varsity football program Chancellor Phillip DuBois stated “I do believe that football 
will enrich the student experience here, enliven school spirit, and serve as one more 
bond of engagement between the students and their university” (DuBois, 2008). Dr. 
DuBois‟s statement reiterates what many campus leaders believe: That there is a link 
between institutional branding and college athletics. The prior sections of this paper have 
been used to explain the idea of escalation and the notion of branding. This study will 
help provide a clearer understanding of the link between institutional branding and 
escalation within an athletic department using a qualitative research methodology. 
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Method 
 This research, which involves examining intercollegiate athletics at this particular 
institution, draws from interviews with university administrators, athletic department 
personnel and faculty, as well as significant research in the university archives. Eleven 
interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format with key participants. Participants 
included current and former faculty members, athletic administrators, and campus 
leaders. These participants were chosen because of their knowledge of both the 
university and athletic department. Each interview averaged forty five minutes in length. 
By asking semi-structured questions, I was able to expand on my initial question and 
possibly answer more freely. This will allow the reader to capture the perspective of an 
informed participant. 
 During the initial phase of the study an email was sent to fourteen possible interview 
subjects. The subjects were chosen due to their knowledge of the situation at the 
particular institution being investigated. The e-mail detailed my background, research 
agenda, and requesting an interview at the subject‟s convenience. Of the initial fourteen 
requests, eleven subjects agreed to participate. Their interviews were conducted both on 
campus and via telephone using an audio recorder. In the initial correspondence all 
interviewees were made aware that the interviews would be recorded and transcribed. 
Only two interviewees in my data collection asked that their interviews not be recorded. 
In both cases, their requests were honored. 
 During all interviews detailed notes were taken regarding the subject matter. After 
each interview was conducted and the material was transcribed and studied, a follow up 
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phone call was initiated to the interviewee to further discuss the main points on the 
interview. This was undertaken to make sure that I understood the facts and represented 
the interviewee‟s insights appropriately. The questions used for the interviews, which 
can be found in Appendix A, provided me with a foundation to begin the research.   
 To address the issue of credibility we employ two techniques. The first involves 
“triangulation”. Lincoln & Guba (1985) state that “triangulation involves the use of 
multiple and different methods, investigators, sources, and theories to obtain 
corroborating evidence.” Triangulation also reduces the possibility of chance 
associations, as well as systematic biases prevailing due to specific method being 
utilized, thereby allowing greater confidence in any interpretations made (Fielding & 
Fielding, 1986). Triangulation techniques were employed for validity purposes (Stake, 
1995). Specifically, both data and investigator triangulation techniques were employed. 
Data triangulation is defined as “the use of a variety of data sources in a study (Patton, 
2002, p.247).” Investigator techniques involve “the use of several different researchers 
and evaluators (Patton, 2002, p. 247).” 
 The second technique that was employed to address credibility was “member 
checking”. Member checking is a process through which respondents verify data and 
interpretations (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Each interviewee received, via e-mail, a copy of 
their transcripts (or parts of the transcript that are usable) for their review. Any requested 
changes were made and the transcripts resent back to the participant. All data was 
verified though this process. 
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Trustworthiness 
 Trustworthiness is an important part of qualitative research. According to the 
literature in qualitative research, trustworthiness is defined as that quality of an 
investigation that “made it noteworthy to audiences” (Schwandt, 2001, p. 258). Denzin 
and Lincoln (1994) suggest that establishing trustworthiness depends on four 
components: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. In 
documenting these guidelines “Lincoln and Guba sought to establish criteria (and 
associated procedures) that were more appropriate than traditional epistemic criteria 
(e.g., internal and external validity) and procedures for judging the trustworthiness of 
naturalistic investigations (Schwandt, 1997, p.164).” 
 Secondary data included document analyses of board minutes, press releases, and 
newspaper clippings. Because of the visibility of the university and its athletic programs 
there was an abundance of articles in the popular press. Site visits to the university 
archives yielding numerous unpublished documents relevant to the subject matter. 
 Credibility. Credibility is an evaluation of whether or not the research findings 
represent a credible conceptual interpretation of the data drawn from the participant‟s 
original data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 296). Credibility will be established by peer 
debriefing. Peer debriefing will be used by allowing fellow professors from my subject 
area (sport management and business) to view my field notes and help with my thought 
processes. The information obtained will be used to correlate a fit with the subject matter 
being investigated. 
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 Transferability. Transferability refers to the degree to which findings of a particular 
study can apply or transfer beyond the bounds of the research. “It concerns the inquirer‟s 
responsibility for providing readers with sufficient information on the case studied (Case 
A) such that readers could establish the degree of similarity between the case studied and 
the case to which findings may be transferred (Case B) (Schwandt, 1997, p.164).” In 
essence, transferability allows other researchers to apply the findings of this study to 
like-minded studies that they might conduct. While the findings in this paper are meant 
to transfer to other streams of research it should be acknowledged that all institutions 
and their athletic programs operate in different social, political, and economic settings. 
 Dependability and confirmability. Dependability is an assessment of the quality of 
the integrated processes of data collection, data analysis, and theory generation. In 
essence it refers to the stability of the findings over time. Confirmability is a measure of 
how well the inquiry‟s findings are supported by the data collection (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). Lincoln and Denzin (1994) state that confirmability is the internal coherence of 
the data in relation to the findings, interpretations and recommendations.  Both 
dependability and confirmability can be determined through the use of a properly 
managed audit (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). To establish dependability, the auditor will 
examine the process and to ensure that the process was applicable to the research being 
conducted and whether it was applied consistently (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
 Since Southern Methodist University and their football program are both well 
chronicled in the popular press there is no shortage of articles detailing the subject 
matter. In addition to interviews, I examined local and national newspaper articles and 
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popular books about the subject. Internal documents including board of trustees and 
faculty senate minutes also were examined. A visit to the Fondren Library at SMU was 
used to obtain additional material on the subject matter. Pertinent information, 
specifically minutes from Board of Regents meetings, were obtained in this manner. 
Case Study Methodology 
 I employed a case study method to escalation with an athletic program. “The case 
study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of 
real-life event – such as individual life cycles, organizational and managerial processes, 
neighborhood change, international relations, and the maturation of industries (Yin, 
2003).” This method was chosen because it provides an avenue to both examine data and 
develop theory from that data. Yin continues by noting that cases studies “are the 
preferred strategy (of research) when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when 
the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on contemporary 
phenomenon within some real-life context”. Indeed, the case study method helps the 
researcher and reader better understand complex social phenomena (Yin, 2003). 
 Staw and Ross (1986) suggest that case studies are necessary in the research of 
escalation for two reasons. First, previous research on escalation has become too 
detached from the field. Secondly, they suggest that addition research on this theory 
should search for broad patterns, or prototypes, of escalation (Lipshitz, 1995). The 
research contained in this study demonstrates that college athletics are a product of a 
complex network television system that is starved for content, university administrators 
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that struggle with the direction of their athletic departments, and a public which seems to 
have an insatiable appetite for college sports. 
 This case study was structured in a descriptive and explanatory context. Meaning I 
describe what is currently happening at SMU and their rationale behind undertaking this 
course of action. To examine escalation in a field based study, one needs to find a 
situation with the following characteristics: (1) an ongoing rather than one-shot decision; 
(2) feedback which is ambiguous or negative; (3) an opportunity to commit additional 
resources over time (Staw, 2005). Southern Methodist University fits all these criteria. 
This study will focus on a select university which has struggled in recent years to define 
athletics place within the university. The case study research method is the best way to 
view this subject matter and to develop theory from my findings. 
Limitations 
 The case study presented here focuses on the subject of strategic management 
practices as they relate to intercollegiate athletics. It should be noted that as a private 
institution access to certain information was more limited than information regarding 
public institutions.  Information for this paper includes both primary and secondary 
sources. The primary sources include interviews with personnel that were directly 
involved in the scenarios. Secondary sources included document analysis. Other sources 
include academic articles and books written on the subject of higher education, strategic 
management, organizational behavior, and intercollegiate athletics. 
 As this paper relies primarily on the interviews with the principal actors involved in 
the process it brings their bias to print. As always when one relies on people‟s memories 
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on events long past the risk of interview discrepancies is possible. To combat that, 
events that might come into question have been verified by multiple sources. While this 
paper focuses on a select university, we acknowledge that Division I college athletic 
departments operate in vastly different circumstances. 
A Brief History of Football at SMU 
 The history of football at SMU, a private, religiously affiliated university located in 
Dallas, Texas, is rich in tradition. The school can boast an undisputed national 
championship team (1935), a shared national championship (1982), and countless All-
Americans. The success of SMU was heightened by the fact that there were no 
professional sports teams in Dallas until the late 1960‟s. It was a historic era for football 
at SMU as the growing metropolis embraced the hometown team. 
 From 1980-1985, SMU had the winningest Division I football program in the nation. 
However, behind all the success a renegade culture that persisted within the football 
program would set the stage for the toughest sanctions ever administered by the NCAA. 
This era came to an end after the 1986 season when the NCAA investigated the school 
for the second time in five years, for paying players, and issued the strongest penalty 
ever received by a NCAA member institution. The penalty, brought on by illegal 
payments to players, called for the school to effectively shut down the football program 
for two years.  After hiring a new school President, Kenneth Pye who had been the Dean 
of the law school at Duke University, the football program was reinstated during the 
1989 season. Initially, because of the great football heritage of the school, there had been 
little conversation regarding reclassifying the athletics program to another division 
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within the NCAA. However, utilizing a low cost strategy typically employed by small, 
private schools that called for low salaried head football coach and minimal spending, 
the program managed just one winning season from 1989 through 2009. 
A New Beginning  
 When Steve Orsini took over the athletic director‟s job at SMU on June 1, 2006, he 
was given a directive by the President and the Chairman of the Board of Trustees. They 
wanted him to lower the subsidies the school was providing athletics and put all SMU 
teams in a position to finish in the top 25 in their respective sports. They noted that the 
infamous “death penalty” was almost two decades behind them and they wanted to 
remake the athletic department into the “front porch” of the university. 
 In 2008, Orsini hired June Jones as head football coach for a reported $2,000,000 a 
year salary. A record contract for a non-BCS school. Although Jones track record as a 
head football coach was impressive, not everyone on campus thought this was the 
direction SMU should be taking regarding university expenditures. One student wrote in 
Hilltopics, a SMU magazine “By hiring Jones to such an expensive contract, SMU has 
publicly announced its commitment to winning at football, but it has also simultaneously 
announced something much less glamorous: that 2 million dollars a year will not be 
spent bettering the education of its student or realizing its core mission, but on an 
extracurricular activity – a luxury, an appendix to the central experience. It demonstrates 
that SMU‟s core mission – education – is in jeopardy of being compromised by a 
plethora of competing interests.” (Baty, 2008). 
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 Using the University of Southern California as a model, campus administrators 
wanted to use athletics to boost the name recognition of the school. SMU administrators 
believed that the University of Southern California did a good job using its athletic 
department to promote the academic mission of the school. Like SMU, The University 
of Southern California also is a private research institution that participates in Division I 
athletics. Campus administrators at SMU feel that boosting the schools name recognition 
will help them meet their goals of attracting quality students and increasing the 
endowment. Parlaying the benefits of SMU as the only university in Dallas that 
competes in Division I athletics, they looked to use athletics to create visibility for the 
school. This visibility would eventually drive enrollment and increase alumni giving 
specifically the school‟s endowment. It was evident in discussions with senior campus 
administrators that they harbor dreams of one day being invited back into a major B.C.S. 
conference. Membership in the B.C.S. would put SMU in one of the six premier college 
athletic conferences and allow the school to benefit from significant media coverage and 
monetary rewards. 
Findings and Analysis 
 Data collected revealed four main themes regarding escalating spending on athletics 
at Southern Methodist University. These four themes were 1) a priority on institutional 
branding, 2) the importance of campus atmosphere, 3) perceived alumni status in the 
community and 4) school location and identity. Within the institutional branding theme a 
sub-theme of student enrollment and increased endowment was also present.  Under the 
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second theme – the importance of campus atmosphere – a subtheme centering on 
increased spending on athletic faculties emerged. 
A Priority on Institutional Branding 
 SMU‟s institutional branding plan involved increasing school visibility and 
developing a better campus atmosphere. This, it is hoped, will increase student 
enrollment and endowment. Central to this plan was for the athletic department to be a 
“window to the university”. This included having athletics participate in the NCAA 
Division I classification. Campus administrators at SMU believe fielding a Division I 
football program is a key component in how the school is viewed by outside 
constituencies. 
 One of the central themes gathered from interviewees is the desire to use athletics as 
a tool for branding the university. As college athletics continues down a more 
commercial path, higher education institutions and their athletic program are under 
increased media attention. This increase in media attention is often followed by an 
increase in monetary support for athletic programs. Indeed, one administrator noted “the 
problem with athletics at this institution is that it is the primary tool in selling the 
school.”  However, the problem that this administrator articulated is indeed the model 
that top campus administrators have adopted. The statement below from an athletic 
administrator describes the schools vision: 
We have a three pronged approach regarding what we expect from 
athletics. We want athletics to help us build our institutional brand. If we 
have a strong brand that will help us attract students, something we are 
always mindful of, and we think it will help us grow our endowment long 
term. 
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The quote shows that the school has tied athletics and institutional branding with the 
long term goal of increasing the endowment and student enrollment. 
 Numerous interviewees stated that the money spent on athletics at SMU is being 
spent with the hopes of increasing the visibility of the school. Administrators believe this 
increase in visibility will help position the school in the minds of prospective students. 
Interviewees also stated that the increased visibility will help increase the school‟s 
enrollment. 
Academically we‟re not Harvard, Vanderbilt or Rice; we have to make this 
school relevant to students and particularly their parents. Students fees (tuition) 
drive the finances here. 
 
 Student enrollment. Like most small, private universities student enrollment is 
important. This is especially true at SMU, where campus administrators for years have 
been trying to increase the number of applicants to the school. By increasing the number 
of applicants, through the use of institutional branding, the school can be more selective 
in who they admit. This increase in applications is thought to lead to higher caliber 
students. 
It is important for us to keep up the number of applicants to the school. This 
allows us to be more selective in admitting students. We honestly feel football 
helps us in achieving the goal (of attracting students). 
 
Campus administrators believe that intercollegiate athletics play an important role in 
both promoting the SMU brand to future students and serving as a entertainment vehicle 
for current students. Participants explained. 
As a private institution, a sizable portion of our operating budget comes from 
student tuition. This reliance on tuition places an emphasis on student enrollment 
and retention. These kids pay a lot of money to come here. 
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The above quotes demonstrate a link between institutional branding and student 
enrollment. In SMU‟s model, campus administrators also draw a link between 
institutional branding, student enrollment and an increased endowment. 
 Increased endowment. Another area of emphasis among interviewees was the 
schools endowment. An endowment is defined as money that is donated to the school, 
usually with the stipulation that it be invested and only the interest from the money used 
for operational expenses.  The total value of these investments is referred to as the 
institution‟s endowment. It is the financial benchmark for which educational institutions 
are measured. This is true at most universities, especially small, private institutions who 
cannot depend on state support. 
One of the main focuses of this administration is increasing the schools 
endowment, as is the case at all universities. I don‟t know if there is any 
empirical data to back me up on this but yes, I think football helps. 
 
 School administrators also saw a link between institutional branding and increasing 
the schools endowment. What is interesting is not that they saw a link between branding 
and increased endowment, but that they assumed such a link despite no empirical 
evidence that would suggest one. 
We believe there is a link between branding this institution and increasing the 
endowment. Central to our branding strategy is athletics, particularly football. In 
order to increase the endowment we have to make the school relevant to different 
constituents. Athletics helps us do that by allowing us to reach many of those 
constituents. 
 
 As a small, private institution school administrators have to constantly monitor the 
schools endowment. Administrators continually provided a link between how the outside 
world viewed SMU and the school‟s endowment. One campus administrator noted “we 
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need to publicize this university to the outside world as much as possible, athletics helps 
us meet that goal.”  Again, this administrator makes an assumption that there is a link 
between publicizing the university and athletics. 
Importance of Campus Atmosphere 
 Many interviewees detail a link between the building of a new on-campus stadium 
with an increase in campus atmosphere. One faculty member stated: 
So much of our athletic history has happened off campus. At all the other schools 
I taught at prior to coming to SMU, athletics added something to the campus. 
When I got here (SMU) it was a shock to find out that the football team played 
its home games twenty miles away from campus. 
 
 Central to the plan was the building of the on campus Gerald Ford stadium. This 
stadium was built in 2000 at a cost of $42 million dollars. A faculty member stated that 
“we had to invest in a new stadium. The old one was decaying and our rivals, 
particularly Texas and Texas A&M, did not want to play us at home.” One former 
administrator added: 
You have to remember that all home games used to be played at the Cotton 
Bowl. Until the new stadium was built there was no on campus atmosphere. 
Now, we close off the street before each home game and it‟s like a party 
atmosphere. We call it “The Boulevard at SMU.” It truly has made a difference 
in the perception of athletics at the school. The business and law schools can 
have their alumni out to game and show off their buildings and then walk over to 
the game. 
 
The “Boulevard at SMU” is the schools way of creating an exciting place to be prior to 
the football games. Modeled after “The Grove” at the University of Mississippi, the 
Boulevard is SMU‟s way of getting alumni to come back on campus and rekindle that 
college atmosphere. 
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SMU is marketing what they call “The Boulevard at SMU” to develop more of a 
campus atmosphere. This involves closing street off and creating a festival type 
of feel before and after the games. 
 
Campus Atmosphere as a Contextual Determinant 
 One of the goals of the administration was to improve the campus atmosphere at the 
school. This is an interesting goal given that the school is a beautiful combination of red 
brick buildings and an abundance of green grass areas located in one of Dallas‟s 
wealthiest suburbs. One of the centerpieces of SMU‟s plan to improve campus 
atmosphere was Gerald J. Ford stadium. This stadium represents the schools biggest 
expenditure (excluding scholarships) since football‟s reinstatement. 
 School administrators have explicitly tied the importance of campus atmosphere in 
with maintaining a Division I athletics program. Although the phrase campus 
atmosphere is vague in meaning it should be noted that many top research universities 
have an abundance of campus atmosphere despite not participating in Division I 
athletics. This is what Ross and Staw (1993) define as a contextual determinant. 
Contextual determinants are defined as issues “larger than the organization itself, 
involving forces beyond the organization‟s boundaries (Ross & Staw, 1993, p.719).” 
Campus atmosphere is defined differently by many university stakeholders. Because of 
the vagueness of the phrase campus atmosphere, school administrators can continue to 
escalate spending without having any benchmarks of which to be judged. 
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Perceived Alumni Status within the Community  
 Alumni often view their school through the lens of athletics. More specifically, these 
interviewees continuously viewed their status in the community through their school and 
its athletic programs. As such, they are willing to spend money for season tickets and 
donate to the school‟s endowment. The research found that this was particularly true at 
SMU. Interviewees noted that this was the result of the importance of football in this 
region. One of the factors in continuing to participate in Division I athletics was the role 
of alumni. One top SMU administrator noted “Our alumni want and need athletics to be 
successful and we (SMU) need those alumni to give donations to the school.” 
 Unlike corporate executives who specific shareholders (shareholders) to please, 
college administrators have many stakeholders with varying degrees of influence. In 
college athletics, one of these groups of influential stakeholders are alumni. Alumni 
often hold sway over athletic department decision making. It was evident in the 
interviews for this paper that alumni and more accurately the alumni‟s status within the 
community played an important role in the decision making process at the school. One 
alumnus stated: 
When I was at SMU, our rivals were the University of Texas, Texas A&M 
University, Texas Tech and Baylor. I still associate SMU with those schools. 
When we (SMU) got left out of the Big 12 it hurt and my colleagues let me know 
it! 
 
As is the case at most institutions of higher education, SMU‟s alumni constitute a major 
constituency within the school. Interviewees consistently expressed the opinion that 
SMU alumni and their status within the Dallas community as being intertwined. One 
interviewee stated: 
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You have to remember our alumni live in the neighborhoods directly across the 
street from campus. I‟m exaggerating a bit, however we do have an inordinate 
amount of alumni nearby. Most residential universities don‟t have that. 
 
This quote demonstrates that SMU‟s alumni play an active role in the direction of the 
school‟s athletic programs. In essence they want the school to commit the resources 
needed to participate in Division I athletics. SMU alumni want to view their school 
through the lens of the SWC, even though that conference disbanded in 1996. 
School Location and Identity 
 Many interviewees stated that as a long time member of the Southwest Conference 
(SWC) SMU‟s institutional identity is forever tied to their former SWC rivals. Those 
former SWC schools that interviewees cited were the University of Texas, Texas A&M 
University and Texas Tech University. However, it should be noted that those 
institutions are large, state supported research schools with significantly more resources 
to devote to athletics (EADA, 210). By continuing to identify and compete with their 
former SWC rivals, SMU is entering into an escalation situation regarding athletic 
department expenditures. 
 When Gerald Turner took over the presidency of SMU in 1995 he implemented a 
strategic plan to increase the national reputation of the school and restore ties to the 
Dallas community. President Turner knew that the attitude of the city towards the school 
had to change if SMU was to fulfill its institutional mission. 
 Interviewees were consistent in stating that one of the reasons for continuing 
competing at the Division I level was that the schools identity was an acknowledgement 
that both national and local stakeholders viewed the school through the lens of athletics. 
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This theme had two meanings. The first dealt with the schools identity as the only 
research university in Dallas that participated in Division I athletics. Interviewees for 
this study repeatedly stated that if the school was going to reach its full potential it 
needed to take advantage of its location: 
The best thing SMU has going for it is its location (Dallas) and the fact that it is 
the only Division I football playing school within the city. One of these days one 
of the main (BCS) conferences is going to expand, and when they do we (SMU) 
want to be able to offer that conference this city. It is essential that we sell our 
assets. And our biggest asset is our location and the fact that we are the only 
Division I athletic program in Dallas. 
 
 The interviewees also spoke about the importance that football plays in the state of 
Texas as a mechanism for promoting the schools identity. Interviewees for this study 
noted that the school clearly hopes to leverage its identity as the only university with a 
Division I athletics program in the city of Dallas into an invitation to a more prestigious 
conference. The best scenario is an invitation to a BCS conference. One athletic 
administrator noted that “every ten years or so conferences within Division I realign. 
When that happens we want to have a winning football program and a large fan base. 
Those factors, plus our location as the only Division I program in a huge city should put 
us into play (for a spot in a BCS conference).” Another added: 
For us to be taken seriously as an institution they‟re a large segment of this 
school that believes we need to play athletics, particularly football, at the highest 
levels. 
 
The above statements show the link between school identity and the school‟s athletic 
program. Perhaps, it would be better stated to say that it showed a perceived linkage 
between school identity and the school‟s athletic program. Campus administrators 
interviewed noted their belief that SMU because of its location in the city of Dallas 
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would be attractive candidate to a BCS conference. One athletic administrator stated “the 
BCS conferences realign every decade or so. By making the investments in athletics that 
we are making and with our location in a large metropolitan it will help us position this 
institution for BCS membership.” However, one faculty member noted this regarding the 
logic of parlaying SMU‟s location in Dallas to future BCS conference membership “we 
are spending an inordinate amount of money (on athletics) on the small chance the 
Southeastern Conference expands west or the Big Twelve Conference expands. 
Regarding the latter option, the Big Twelve would surely choose TCU over us given 
their recent football success.” 
 It would seem to some observers that SMU‟s past problems with athletics would 
cause the school to examine the possibility of moving their athletics programs out of 
Division I to a lower less competitive classification. One faculty member stated “we had 
a perfect opportunity to leave Division I after the death penalty but the administration 
balked.”  However another long time faculty member that has been on numerous athletic 
committees over the years stated “there was no thought put in to not playing at the 
Division I level after the death penalty. The football heritage at the school is simply too 
great”. However this same faculty member admitted that in the early 90‟s the school was 
at a crosswords with football: 
The school formed a committee to discuss athletics in the early 90‟s. Obviously, 
football was not successful. We did look at the issue of moving to Division III, 
although I‟m not sure it was ever a serious consideration. What league would we 
play in? The schools in Texas that play Division III are not research institutions 
and that is an important part of this school. 
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School Identity as a Social Determinant 
 The location of SMU, in the heart of one of college‟s football biggest areas, has been 
both the schools greatest strength and biggest obstacle. The wealthy alumni that live in 
the area that surrounds the school helped SMU to achieve the 51st largest endowment of 
any university in the country (NACUBO, 2009). However, social determinates within 
escalation research address an unwillingness to lose credibility in the face of unexpected 
losses.  The research conducted for this paper noted that campus administrators appeared 
averse to exploring the possibility of leaving Division I athletics. When pressed for a 
reason, most interviewees noted the social pressures of being located in a state that puts 
an enormous emphasis on college football. 
 Regarding the schools location in a large metropolitan city, school administrators 
seem to be stating that because Dallas is such a large city the BCS conferences should 
consider extending an invitation to SMU. Using this logic, small towns like Waco, 
Texas, Pullman, Washington, and Auburn, Alabama should not be the location of BCS 
schools or that the University of Houston has a better chance of getting a BCS 
conference bid since they are located in the fourth largest city in the country. The 
school‟s strategy seems to be to leverage the schools location with an increase in 
spending on athletics to hopefully receive a BCS conference invitation. In previous 
escalation studies, Brockner et al. (1984) notes increased spending on projects often 
involves situations “where there is no objective or physical yardstick of comparisons do 
not exist” (p. 81). Moving an athletics department to BCS status is one of those 
situations. 
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 As an invitation only organization, the BCS has no guidelines for entry. By falling 
prey to a belief that increased spending and school location will help increase 
membership chances, school administrators motivations have switched from making 
rational decisions to simply rationalizing their increasingly large expenditures on 
athletics (Brockner et al.,1984 p.79). 
 Ross and Staw (1986) note that as projects proceed the need for external justification 
grows as budgets are increased. When SMU started an intercollegiate athletic program 
the costs of maintaining the program was relatively small. Because of the growth in 
college athletics those costs have expanded. In addition, the public has established a link 
between the credibility of the universities and their athletics program. The university‟s 
credibility has been tied to maintaining a Division I athletic program. 
School Location as a Contextual Determinant 
 SMU clearly thinks it has a competitive advantage in that it is the only research 
university that participates in Division athletics in Dallas. However, as a relatively small 
university, SMU graduates a much smaller number of students a year than larger state 
schools. As such, the school does not have the same level of fan support of many large 
state universities. Interviewees for this paper acknowledged that even during the years 
when the school fielded nationally ranked football teams they struggled to sell out their 
off campus stadium. The interviewees used this as an example of the schools lack of a 
major fan base. 
 SMU also has to contend with being a small private school located in state that has 
many large publically supported universities. Many of these public universities, 
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including the University of Texas, Texas A&M University, and Texas Tech, have far 
more alumni in the Dallas metropolitan area than SMU. This would seem to negate 
administrator‟s hopes of delivering the city of Dallas to a BCS conference. 
 This is an example of a contextual determinant. It is important to note that SMU is 
forever tied to the larger research institutions that play Division I football in the state of 
Texas. These external forces play a critical role in the culture and political arenas that 
SMU competes in. In SMU‟s case, the decision to continue participation in Division I 
athletics “became larger than the organization itself, involving forces beyond the 
organizations boundaries (Ross & Staw, 1993 p.719).” In essence, SMU has wedded 
itself to the decisions of other institutions. These institutions have far more resources in 
which to compete in Division I athletics. 
Psychological Determinants 
 The stadium, named after an alumnus of the school who made a generous donation 
toward its construction, was built at a cost of $42 million. “Having substandard 
facilities,” argues Ford, “make it hard to recruit. If you can‟t recruit, you can‟t win. If 
you don‟t win, people don‟t come. If people don‟t come, the program loses more money 
(McGill, 1998).” Attached to the stadium is the Paul Lloyd All-Sports Center which was 
built in 2000 at a cost of 15 million dollars. While the football stadium was the biggest 
facility expense it certainly was not the only one. In 2007, SMU opened a 13 million 
dollar basketball practice facility. These expenditures on athletic facilities represent what 
organizational theorist call a “sunk cost”. Sunk cost can be defined as cost that cannot be 
recovered once they are incurred (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). 
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 At SMU, this is evident in comments regarding the stadium expenditures. “We‟ve 
put too much money into our stadium to throw in the towel,” said Lance McIlhenny, the 
former president of the SMU Letterman‟s Club (Buchanan, 2008).”  In previous 
escalation research Staw (1993) notes that a psychological determinant in escalation is 
the need to base decision making on past expenditures. Escalation research has also 
found that decisions on continuing a course of action are best decided when parties 
involved examine the merits of the project moving forward rather than adding up the 
cost that has been previously invested (Staw & Ross, 1993). 
Organizational Determinants 
 In escalation research, Ross and Staw‟s (1993) found that external parties may come 
to the rescue of a declining organization via threatening to persevere in the losing course 
of action (Meyer & Zucker, 1989). Often, the external party that helps the university 
absorb the cost of athletics is alumni. As an example at SMU, the majority of the head 
coach June Jones‟s $2,000,000 a year salary is paid by a group of wealthy alumni. The 
previous coach, Phil Bennett‟s entire salary of roughly $500,000 was paid for using 
athletic department funds. Appeals to SMU alumni for cash infusions might change the 
short term economic fortunes of the athletic department, therefore making withdrawal 
unlikely, but will probably do little for the long term financial health of the athletic 
department.  In essence, wealthy alumni are manipulating the economic merits of the 
argument by taking away short term losses which serves to mask long term problems. 
 Ross and Staw (1993) note that part of an ongoing escalation situation is the role of 
organizational determinates. An organizational determinant that played a key role in the 
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SMU case was the role of institutionalization. Although athletics was initially started at 
the school in the early 1900‟s as a recreational activity over time this purpose has 
evolved. In its present form SMU football has come to define how many external and 
internal stakeholders view the university. Because athletics at SMU has become part of 
the institutions fabric many of those interviewed stated that the school would continue to 
fund the programs at any costs. 
 The decision to continuing participation in Division I athletics involves far more 
investments than simply supplying scholarships to prospective student-athletes. The 
school must hire coaches, trainers, administrators, as well as game day staff.  One of the 
main characteristics of organizational determinates are what Ross and Staw (1993) call 
“side-bets”. These side-bets are defined as additional investments dependant on the 
continuing a certain course of action. These side-bets can be either implicit or explicit in 
nature. In the SMU study, the university has made a “side-bet” with alumni to continue 
playing Division I athletics as long as it‟s supplemented by these external stakeholders 
as well as university funds. Another example of a “side-bet” is tying athletic programs 
with the overall school identity. 
Implications and Organizational Exit 
 While not part of the escalation of commitment framework, organizational exit is an 
important factor to consider because of the rising costs associated with operating a  
Division I athletics program. As college athletics moves toward a more commercial 
model, university administrators have to ask themselves tough questions regarding the 
direction of their athletic programs. “Much of organizational theory can be reduced to 
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two fundamental questions – how do we get organizations moving and how do we get 
them stopped once they are moving in a particular direction (Ross & Staw, 1993 
p.701)?” How to stop intercollegiate athletics when it is moving down the wrong path is 
particularly challenging. Unlike corporate executives who have only firm shareholders to 
please, college administrators have many stakeholders with varying degrees of influence. 
 Administrators should be aware of two important factors when discussing the future 
direction of their athletic programs: 1) the purported link between increased enrollments 
and athletic success, and 2) the endowment myth. 
The Purported Link Between Expenditures and Institutional Branding 
 The central theme of this research has been the link between excessive athletic 
department expenditures and institutional branding. Roy, Graeff, & Harmon (2008) state 
that Division I football has been cited as a positioning tool by administrators who wish 
to reshape the peer group with which their institutions are associated through 
participation in “big time” college football. While reshaping a university‟s peer group 
with the help of college athletics is a worthy goal, problems arise when money is 
redistributed from university funds to accomplish this objective. Increasingly, this is the 
case in college athletics. 
Athletics and Student Enrollment 
 One of the main goals of the administration at SMU is to consistently address student 
enrollment. Interviewees have stated that student tuition and fees helps drive the schools 
finances. A large student application pool also allows for better student selection. 
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A common misconception among university stakeholders is that success on the football 
field leads to increases in both the schools applications and enrollment. Football fans 
have even given a name to this theory, “the Flutie Factor”. Named after Doug Flutie, the 
famous Boston College quarterback who completed a last second touchdown pass in a 
game against the University of Miami in 1984, the play helped the school to a 12% 
increase in applications to the school in 1985 (Frank, 2004). Few would argue that a 
majority of students enjoy attending a football game on the SMU campus. Whether or 
not Division I athletics increase student enrollment is debatable. 
 Research is mixed on the correlation between successful football teams and student 
enrollment. A study by Toma and Cross (1996) as reported in Franks (2004) paper 
presented to the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics stated that football 
championships at the University of Miami (1987) and Georgia Tech (1990) were 
followed by 33% and 21% increases in applications respectively. Five other football 
championship seasons were followed by applications increases of between 10% and 
20%, and the remaining championship seasons were followed by “only modest gains”. 
 These increases are expected given the enormous media attention focused on 
national championship football games. “Much less expected, however, is that Toma and 
Cross were unable to find any measurable impact of these increases in the quality of 
admitted or entering students” (Frank, 2004 p.19). The authors prefaced the gains by 
stating that a school‟s national championship visibility may have “more impact on the 
search phase, and less on the choice phase, of student college choice (Frank, 2004). 
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These points deserved mentioning given SMU‟s goal of increased enrollment not merely 
applications. 
Endowment Myth 
 It is a popular myth that there is a direct correlation between successful athletic 
teams and alumni giving. Robert Frank, in a 2004 paper commissioned by the Knight 
Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, examined numerous studies to find out whether 
this theory holds true. “The findings reported in these studies are mixed, but the overall 
message is easily summarized. It is that if success in athletics does generate the indirect 
benefits in question, the effects are almost surely very small.” 
 The above examples of increased enrollment and endowment, describe what Staw 
and Ross (1986) categorize as information processing errors.  Information processing 
errors are defined as continuing to support a perseverance of beliefs despite evidence to 
the contrary. Campus administrators continually stated that one of the benefits of 
continuing Division I athletics was the correlation between athletics and alumni giving 
and increased endowment. However, data on the subject shows that if there is a 
correlation it is surely small (Frank, 2004). 
 Daniel Fulks, an accounting professor at Transylvania University, has examined 
NCAA finances and found that only 56% of the 119 Division I football participating 
universities showed a profit in 2006 (Gelb & Ramsey, 2008). Rational economical 
thinking should dictate that the schools that lose money move down in classification or 
eliminate the money losing sports. This thinking seldom enters the discussion at most 
universities. In the economics of college athletics, market forces and going out of 
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business simply do not apply. In SMU‟s case, the university has and will probably 
continue to subsidize athletics.  Even those administrators interviewed for this paper 
admitted that even when the school‟s football team was successful it still was not 
profitable. 
 As Meyer and Zucker (1989) noted, it is sometimes possible for an entity to become 
a permanently failing organization, perhaps by absorbing resources from third parties or 
somehow generating enough revenue to offset continuing losses (Ross & Staw, 1993). In 
college athletics, particularly at small private Division I institutions, the school is often 
the third party that absorbs the losses. This has been an acceptable practice at most 
schools for years. However, the recent economic downtown has made administrators at 
least acknowledge that there might be a problem with continuously subsidizing athletics 
at the expense of other academic needs more aligned with the institutions mission. 
 With the recent conference reorganizations and the creation of the B.C.S. an 
unintended consequence has been the creation of a group of institutions that do not have 
the resources to compete yet battle constant isomorphic pressures to stay the course 
regarding their athletic pursuits. Like SMU, these institutions tend to be small, private 
schools.  Over time these schools are going to have to evaluate the benefits of continued 
participation in Division I athletics. 
 There are numerous examples of high quality academic institutions that do not 
participate at the Division I level. All schools that comprise the Ivy League participate at 
the Division I-AA classification. Research institutions like the University of Chicago, 
Washington University and Carnegie Mellon participate at the Division III level. There 
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are also examples of academically prestigious schools that are not members of the BCS 
that continue to participate in Division I athletics on a strict budget. Tulane University, 
Rice University and the University of Tulsa serve as examples of this model. 
 As is the situation with any case study there are factors which make athletics at 
Southern Methodist University unique. One of those factors is that athletics, in particular 
football, has been associated with the university for years. However, this case study 
acknowledges that seldom does a major course of action, like continuing to participate in 
Division I athletics, come down to one major mistake in decision making, instead it is 
usually a process of assumptions developed over time. As such, schools need to be 
aware of the consequences of escalating spending on athletics programs. As Ross and 
Staw (1993. p.295) illustrate “once a project is structurally embedded it may be 
extremely difficult to reverse courses of action.” 
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CHAPTER III 
A CASE STUDY OF BIRMINGHAM SOUTHERN COLLEGE 
 A common phrase in our vernacular - “If at first you don‟t succeed, try, and try, 
again” – stresses the value of persistence in American culture. While there are certainly 
benefits associated with persistence, problems arise when organizations (or people) 
remain financially committed to a project despite overwhelming evidence that their 
action is counterproductive if not detrimental to the individual in a given organization. 
“Much of organizational theory can be reduced to two fundamental questions – how do 
we get organizations moving, and how do we get them stopped once they are moving in 
a particular direction (Ross & Staw, 1993)?” Stopping escalation behavior within 
organizations that have numerous stakeholders is particularly difficult. Birmingham 
Southern College (BSC), a small private liberal arts institution located in Birmingham, 
Alabama, faced such a decision with regard to their athletics program. 
 College athletic department budgets are increasing at an alarming rate (Fulk, 2009). 
This is especially true at the Division I classification (Fulk, 2009). Increasingly, when 
athletic department revenues cannot cover expenses institutional funds fill the gap. 
Institutional stakeholders believe that universities could spend financial resources 
devoted to athletics on programs that exemplify the college‟s mission. The problem is 
exacerbated at small, private schools that often do not have the resources of large, public 
institutions. These private schools tend to remain committed to Division I athletics 
because of the visibility that it brings to the institution (Roy, Graeff & Harmon, 2008). 
When the institution lends money to the athletic department it leads to a situation where 
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they are investing scarce resources without any hopes of recouping their investments. In 
layman‟s terms, these schools are throwing good money after bad. Management scholars 
have a label for this phenomenon - called escalation of commitment – which occurs 
when institutions become entrapped in failing courses of action. 
 This paper will discuss Birmingham Southern College‟s decision to reclassify their 
Division I athletics program to non-scholarship Division III classification. This decision 
was made despite the fact that the school had only recently moved its athletics program 
to the NCAA‟s Division I classification from the National Association of Intercollegiate 
Athletics (NAIA). The study will focus on the internal and external factors that 
contributed to campus administrators‟ decision. This paper will begin by providing an 
overview of college athletic and then move into a discussion of the literature pertaining 
to escalation of commitment theory. Next, an outline of the problem statement, research 
questions and research methodology from which this study was grounded will be 
explored before presenting a case study of Birmingham Southern College and its 
struggle with escalation within the athletic department. The finding/analysis section will 
discuss the central themes derived from the data, followed by a thorough data analysis. 
Finally, the paper will conclude by providing the reader with a foundation from which to 
consider a framework, which is referred to as de-escalation of commitment, and its 
application to intercollegiate athletics. 
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Guiding Principles for De-escalation within College Athletics 
 The financial obligations of fielding a Division I athletics program have caused 
administrators at smaller, private colleges to ask “if expenditures exceed revenues in 
most college athletic programs, why are universities investing so much more each year 
in these programs” (Frank, 2004)? Recently, Vanderbilt University abolished its athletics 
department. While the school‟s teams would still compete at the Division I level the 
previous responsibilities of the athletic department would be absorbed by the university. 
Campus leaders cited the need for student-athletes to feel better connected to the school 
and not just the athletic department as one of the main reasons for the move. It would 
also allow the university to discontinue the large salaries to athletic department 
personnel. A move that Vanderbilt‟s president thought was a wasteful use of school 
resources, arguing that the same functions could be handled by personnel employed by 
the university. While the move was largely symbolic, few can argue that the school and 
its athletic programs have enjoyed resurgence. 
 Operating a Division I athletics department at a small, private school is expensive. 
Only a small percentage of schools that participate in Division I athletics earn a profit 
(Fulk, 2009). Schools that do not earn a profit are often subsidized by university funds. 
Often the schools that need university funds to operate their athletic department are 
small, private schools. Schools justify the money spent on athletics because of the 
visibility afforded a Division I program (Roy, Graeff & Harmon 2008). In these 
situations a college can find itself in a cycle of escalation. Researchers have a name for 
situations in which organizations increasingly devote financial resources to losing 
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courses of action and have developed a theoretical framework referred to as escalation of 
commitment to examine such actions. 
 Much of the research devoted to escalation of commitment theory focuses on 
situations involving the commitment of decision makers to losing courses of action 
(Simonson & Staw, 1992). In a case study on escalation behavior, Ross and Staw (1993) 
examined a firm that leveraged one company‟s future on a nuclear power plant that was 
never became operational despite many years and millions of dollars invested in this 
plan. The study showed that escalation situations are often the product of dynamic forces 
within the internal and external environment of the firm (Ross & Staw 1993).  There is a 
paucity of research devoted to the study of organizations that reverse their course of 
action after realizing they are entrapped in an escalating situation. This is referred to as 
de-escalation of commitment (Drummond, 1996; Keil & Robey, 1999). Simonson and 
Staw (1992) stated “much of the research in this area has focused on the determinants of 
escalation, and little attention has yet been given to the procedures that might help 
people avoid the escalation trap (p.419).” 
 This article will examine a small, private liberal arts college‟s decision to leave 
NCAA Division I athletics and participate in NCAA non scholarship Division III 
athletics.  Avoiding the escalation trap in college athletics is a subject that needs further 
investigation. There are two important reasons for studying Birmingham Southern‟s 
decision to exit Division I athletics for Division III classification. First, the school is one 
of a few to leave the NCAA‟s Division I classification for non scholarship Division III.  
This fact by itself makes it worthy of further examination. Second, the lessons and 
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strategies undertaken in this move need to be explored to see if they could be beneficial 
to other schools looking at breaking the cycle of escalation that many institutions are 
faced with regarding athletics. Accordingly, this study will attempt to answer the 
following questions, which helped data collection and analysis: 
1) What were the project, social, organizational, psychological, and contextual 
determinants (tenants of Escalation Theory) that contributed to Birmingham 
Southern‟s decision to reclassify its athletics programs to Division III? 
2) Which determinants were more influential in the decision to reclassify the 
athletics program? And why? 
3) What role does the internal and external environment play in the institutions 
decision to discontinue investments in their Division I athletic program? 
Theoretical Framework and Review of Literature 
Escalation Theory 
 Escalation of Commitment theory states that “in many instances individuals (and 
organizations) can become locked into a costly course of action (Staw, 1981 p.577).” 
Staw (1981) continues by noting that “it is often possible for persons (or organizations) 
who have suffered a setback to recoup their losses through an even greater commitment 
of resources to the same course of actions” (p.577). In escalation situations involving 
college athletics, colleges often find themselves participating at a level that does not 
make economic sense for the school. Past literature involving escalating behavior has 
focused on what academic scholars have called determinants of escalation. 
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Determinants of Escalation 
 The main cause of escalation within organizations is the nature of the actual 
organizations themselves and not the individual people within those organizations (Staw 
& Ross, 1987). In academic literature, escalation has been characterized as “the interplay 
of four sets of forces over time (Ross & Staw, 1993 p.702).” These four parts – project, 
psychological, social, and institutional – play a critical role within escalation situations. 
These determinants were part of a framework initially advanced in Ross and Staw‟s 
(1986) examination of British Columbia‟s decision to host the world‟s fair. I provide a 
definition of each determinant based on this work. A fifth determinant – contextual – 
was added in Ross and Staw‟s (1993) work about Long Island Lighting Company‟s 
decision to build the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant. 
 Project determinants. Under this rubric are objective aspects of a project, such as 
its closing costs, its salvage value, the cause of the setbacks to its completion, and the 
economic merits of pursuing or dropping it. This determinant involves assessing the 
economic prospects of a given project decades into the future (Ross & Staw, 1993). As 
an example, research by Northcraft & Neale (1986) found that accurate financial 
information may be necessary for decision makers to withdraw from a losing course of 
action (Ross & Staw, 1993). 
 Psychological determinants. Ross and Staw (1993) note “this category includes 1) 
reinforcement traps (Platt, 1973), 2) individual motivations, 3) decision making errors, 
and 4) biases in information processing. Examples include, difficulties in withdrawing 
from a previously rewarded activity, the need for self-justification; trying to recoup 
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“sunk costs” (resources already invested in a project), and tendencies to view data in the 
direction of preexisting beliefs” (p.702).  Ross and Staw (1993) note “those who have 
advanced to top leadership positions may be prone to reinforcement traps, situations in 
which people assume, because of their histories of success, that losing courses of action 
will improve (p. 716).” As Nisbett and Ross (1980) summarized, people have an almost 
uncanny ability to bias facts in the direction of previously accepted beliefs and 
preferences. 
 Social determinants. This category involves external justification. In lay terms, 
social determinants refer to the unwillingness to lose credibility in the face of 
unexpected losses. Regarding external justification, Ross and Staw state (1986) 
“decision makers may persist in a course of action not only because they do not want to 
admit to themselves that they have made a mistake, but because they may also be 
especially hesitant to expose their errors to others (p.277).” This is exacerbated by our 
culture which associates persistence with strong leadership. As an example, executives 
and other leaders are often judged on their willingness to persist in the face of 
opposition. As an example, Nelson Mandela served for 27 years in a South African 
prison before being released and winning his country‟s presidency. 
 Organizational determinants. This category includes variables such as the level of 
public support for a project within an organization (Pfeffer, 1981), the level of economic 
and technical “side-bets” incurred by the organization with respect to the project (hiring 
of staff, development of expertise) (March,1978). Also included are the extent of the 
project‟s institutionalization within the organization; in other words – how tied it is to 
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the firm‟s values and objectives (Goodman, Bazerman, & Conlon, 1980). In the case 
involving Long Island Lighting Company‟s decision to build the Shoreham Nuclear 
Power Plant, because the project had consumed $5 billion dollars over a 23 year time 
period that it had become institutionalized within the parent company.  
 Contextual determinants. While not initially a part of the escalation a priori model, 
contextual determinants play a vital role in study of organizations with many 
stakeholders. (Ross and Staw, 1993). This is certainly true regarding the study of higher 
education and athletic departments. As an example, Ross and Staw‟s (1993) study of the 
Shoreham nuclear power plant noted “the decision to construct a nuclear power plant 
became larger than the organization itself, involving forces beyond the organization‟s 
boundaries (p.719).” Examples included relationships between state and national energy 
regulation agencies, the countries views toward energy, and the local and national 
political environment. Because athletic department reclassification involves numerous 
external stakeholders, contextual determinants will play an important role in this paper. 
 Escalation of Commitment theory has been used in academic literature to describe 
how organizations (and their decision makers) have a tendency to become locked into 
losing courses of action. The escalation concept has proved popular because it provides 
an explanation for an otherwise difficult to understand process such as the behaviors 
associated with increasing investments by universities in under-achieving athletic 
programs. Because persistence is often rewarded it is easy for institutions to become 
entangled in a cycle of escalation. Staw (1981) notes that “it is often possible for persons 
(or institutions) who have suffered a setback to recoup their losses through an even 
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greater commitment of resources to the same course of action, a cycle of escalating 
commitment can be produced (p.577).” 
De-escalation Literature 
 There is a paucity of research involving de-escalation situations. Drummond 
explored the de-escalation of a law firm (1995) and hypothesized that de-escalation 
involves a relationship between power, commitment, and the probability of withdrawal. 
She (1995) stated that if escalation theory suggests persistence is a function of the 
decision makers feelings of potency then de-escalation reflected a sense of 
powerlessness. 
 Drummond noted that “withdrawal was most probable under conditions of low 
commitment and high perceived power (p. 278).” In lay terms, participants are most 
likely to withdraw from an escalating situation when there is little financial or personal 
investment and they have a high degree of influence within the organization. For 
example, “when a project is becoming questionable and the organization appoints a new 
chief executive to review the situation the combination of diminishing commitment and 
an empowering brief to effect change would seem highly conducive to withdrawal 
(Drummond 1995, p. 278).” A situation is more likely to escalate if there was a high 
degree of commitment and low perceived power. As an example, “when a project is 
newly commissioned and enthusiasm and commitment is high, challengers and doubters 
may be brushed aside or instructed not to interfere even though their concerns are valid 
and supported with evidence (Drummond, 1995 p. 278).” 
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 Another study pertaining to de-escalation involved an information technology firm 
(Montealegre & Keil, 2000). The authors define de-escalation as a process of redirection 
as well as abandonment (Montealegre & Keil, 2000). Said differently, a project does not 
have to be abandoned for de-escalation to occur. In some cases participants can de-
escalate a project by redirecting the project to a more successful outcome.  “While 
redirection cannot guarantee that the project will be successful, it does signal a reduction 
of commitment in response to a failing course of action (Montealegre & Keil, 2000).” 
The study, which explored the implementation of a state of the art baggage system at the 
newly constructed Denver International Airport, Montealegre & Keil (2000) broke de-
escalation down to four phases. These four phases consisted of 1) problem recognition, 
2) reexamination of a prior course of action, 3) search for alternative courses of action, 
and 4) implementing an exit strategy. Within each of these phases the authors recognized 
key triggering activities. In the problem recognition phase, the prominent triggering 
activities are recognizing negative feedback and responding to external pressures. The 
reexamination of prior course of action phase included triggering moments like 
clarifying and redefining the magnitude of the problem. The search for alternative 
courses of action phase consisted of identifying and legitimizing a new course of action 
along with managing impressions. In the final phase, implementing an exit strategy, the 
triggering activities consisted of appealing to stakeholders and de-institutionalizing the 
project. 
 The reclassification of athletics at Birmingham Southern College was undertaken 
due to both the increasing costs of operating a Division I athletic program and the desire 
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to associate the institution with like minded peer institutions. As the initial study that 
addresses de-escalation within the context of intercollegiate athletics this paper explored 
how a small, private, liberal arts college reclassified its athletic department. 
Method 
 Many of the early empirical studies on escalation phenomenon were laboratory 
based. These studies limited the scope of escalation to testing individual level variables. 
Because of these limited studies, Ross and Staw (1986) noted that “processes such as 
institutionalization have been virtually ignored in the literature, even though they may 
underlie many organizational examples of escalation (p.278).” However, recent literature 
has focused on testing this theory through field based qualitative case studies (Ross & 
Staw 1986, 1993; Drummond 1995; Montealegre & Keil 2000). By providing a specific 
example this study will examine de-escalation in an organizational setting. This study 
will continue the trend of observing escalating and de-escalating scenarios from a 
qualitative inquiry perspective. The case study method has been chosen because it 
represents an opportunity to test this theory during a set period of time. 
Case Study Methodology 
 The case study research method has been used as a research tool in a variety of 
academic disciplines. “Social scientists, in particular, have made wide use of this 
qualitative research method to examine contemporary real-life situations and provide the 
basis for the application of ideas and extension on methods (Soy, 1997).” The case study 
method is appropriate when examining a real life scenario during a certain period of 
time.  Yin (1984, p. 23) notes “the case study research method as an empirical inquiry 
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that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used.” This method is appropriate when building 
theory, producing theory, disputing or challenging theory, explaining theory, or 
describing an object or phenomenon (Soy, 1997). Previous literature has noted a paucity 
of field based research on escalation and de-escalation situations. Academic researchers 
have observed that case studies help strengthen a subject that has become detached from 
the field and allow for the search of broad based patterns regarding escalation and de-
escalation scenarios (Ross & Staw, 1986; Lipshitz, 1995).  As such, the case study is an 
appropriate research method for de-escalation research. 
 Staw (2005) notes that there are three criteria a field based study needs to meet 
regarding escalation situations. The three criteria are (1) an ongoing rather than one-shot 
decision; (2) feedback which is ambiguous or negative; (3) an opportunity to commit 
additional resources over time. During the time period of research for this paper, 
Birmingham Southern fits all three criteria. 
 In the initial phase of the research an e-mail was sent to nine potential interview 
subjects. The subjects included college and athletic department administrators as well as 
current and former faculty members. The criteria used to select these interviewees 
included having an in depth knowledge about the decision making regarding this subject 
matter at both within the college and athletic department. The data gathered for this 
paper represents the experience, knowledge, expertise, and opinions of the interviewees 
during a specific period of time. As such, it brings their bias to print. To combat this I 
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developed a system where my primary sources of data involved interviews with 
personnel directly involved in the subject matter. 
 The e-mail detailed my request for an interview and thoroughly outlined my research 
agenda. Of the initial nine requests, eight subjects agreed to participate. The subjects 
interviewed consisted of faculty, campus administrators and athletic department 
personnel. Their interviews were conducted both on campus and via telephone. All 
interviews were recorded using an audio recorder. In the initial e-mail all interviewees 
were made aware that the interviews would be recorded.  Each interview averaged 
between 30 – 45 minutes in length. 
 During and immediately following the interviews, detailed notes were taken 
regarding the subject matter. These interviews revealed valuable information about both 
escalation within an athletic department at this institution being studied and the general 
state of college athletics. After the interview was conducted and the material was 
transcribed and studied, a follow up phone call was initiated to the interviewee to further 
discuss the main points of the interview. This was conducted to make sure I understood 
and transcribed the interviewee‟s insights accurately. The questions used for the 
interviews are listed in Appendix A. 
Data Collection, Analyzing, and Limitations 
 The primary source for data consisted of interviews with college administrators, 
athletic department administrators, and current and former faculty members. Interviews 
were selected as the primary source of data collection because they provided a detailed 
history of this time period at Birmingham Southern. Secondary sources included 
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document analysis. This document analysis was used to fill in any gaps in the 
information. Other sources, including academic articles about higher education, sport 
management, and organizational behavior were studied to provide background 
information regarding the subject matter. The secondary sources were used to obtained 
general background information about the subject matter. 
 The data gathered from the interviews was arranged in themes using emerging 
category designation. Emergent category designation requires five steps 1) read the first 
unit of data, 2) read the second unit of data, 3) proceed until all the units have been 
assigned to a category, 4) create category titles and/or descriptive sentences that make 
the category unique, and then 5) start over (Erlandson, 1993). The last step allowed me 
to constantly reassess the categories that had emerged and to possible add new ones. 
 Data triangulation was employed to ensure credibility. Patton (2002) defines 
triangulation as “the use of a variety of data sources in a study (p.247).” Lincoln & Guba 
(1985) further note that triangulation “involves the use multiple and different methods, 
investigators, sources, and theories to obtain corroborating evidence.”  In this study I 
employed both data and investigator triangulation techniques. 
 When examining a private educational institution there are going to be more 
limitations involving access to information than a study involving their public 
counterparts. Birmingham Southern was no exception. Although campus administrators 
and faculty were helpful in granting interviewers and access there were some material 
that was not available. 
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 Another restriction of qualitative research is applicability. For other institutions that 
might be contemplating a similar re-classification of their athletic department it would 
be beneficial to state that the purpose of this study was to examine how one small, 
private liberal arts institution handled such a move. It should be noted that all higher 
educational institutions that participate in intercollegiate athletics operate in vastly 
different political, social, and economic environments. 
Trustworthiness 
 Trustworthiness is defined as that quality of an investigation that “made it 
noteworthy to audiences” (Schwandt, 2001 p. 258).  Patton (2002) further defines it as 
“that quality of an investigation (and its findings) that made it noteworthy to audiences.” 
Glesne (1999) suggest that trustworthiness or research validity is an issue that needs to 
be addressed when designing research as well as collecting data. Schwandt (1997) 
developed four criteria of trustworthiness (p.164). Those criteria are: 1) Credibility 
addressed the issue of inquirer providing assurances of the fit between respondents‟ 
views of their life ways and the inquirer‟s reconstruction and representation of same, 2) 
Transferability dealt with the issue of generalization in terms of case-to-case transfer, 3) 
Dependability focused on the process of the inquiry and the inquirer‟s responsibility for 
ensuring that the process was logical, traceable, and documented, 4) Confirmability was 
concerned with establishing the fact that the data and interpretations of an inquiry were 
not merely figments of the inquirer‟s imagination. By adhering to this systematic 
approach I ensured the trustworthiness of the data. During the course of this research 
every effort was made to gather evidence from a multitude of perspectives. Interviews 
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consisted of persons that agreed and disagreed with the president‟s decision to reclassify 
athletics. This helped insure a diversity of opinion regarding what was a major decision 
regarding the direction of the school. 
A History of Birmingham Southern 
 Birmingham Southern College is located in Birmingham, Alabama. The school is a 
result of a merger between two Alabama colleges, Southern College in Greensboro and 
Birmingham College in Birmingham. The two schools were consolidated in 1918 under 
the name of Birmingham Southern College. The campus is located on 192 acres about 
three miles west of downtown Birmingham and maintains a close relationship with the 
Methodist church. Birmingham Southern has consistently sought and garnered academic 
distinction among its peer institutions. In 1939, the school was designated a Phi Beta 
Kappa institution and is consistently ranked as one of the best liberal arts colleges in the 
country. The Phi Beta Kappa distinction is particularly important to the college as it 
represents excellence in liberal arts and sciences education. 
 The modern day success of the school can be tied to the leadership of Dr. Neal Berte. 
Dr. Berte was named the president of the college in 1976 amid growing concerns that the 
institution had lost its direction. In 2004, Berte retired as president of the college and 
was replaced by David Pollick. Located on the west side of Birmingham the school 
prospered when the city became home to a thriving steel industry located just blocks 
from the school. However, as the steel mills closed and industry shifted to other areas of 
the city wealthy civic leaders that had supported the school moved to the southern 
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suburbs. Dr. Berte is credited with repositioning the school on a mission that would best 
serve the college and the city. 
A History of Athletics at Birmingham Southern College 
 Athletics has always played an important role at Birmingham Southern College. 
Following the consolidation of the two institutions in 1918, Birmingham Southern 
football team compiled a 87-80-16 record between 1918-39, winning Dixie Conference 
championships in 1932, 1934, and 1937. The football team enjoyed a perfect season in 
1934, including a road victory over Auburn University (Cole & Wagnon, 2007). 
However, at the end of the 1939 season the football program was disbanded, a victim of 
high cost and undue influence from external stakeholders. While football was no longer 
played on campus, other programs thrived at Birmingham Southern. A longtime member 
of the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA), Birmingham Southern 
enjoyed success in all sports, but primarily in basketball and baseball. The basketball 
team won the NAIA national championship in 1990 and 1995. The baseball team won 
the national championship in 2001. However, there was a feeling on campus that they 
had outgrown the NAIA and the school petitioned the NCAA for acceptance into the 
organizations Division I level, the highest level of competition in intercollegiate 
athletics. 
 It was clear in early 1999, the school had to make a decision regarding the direction 
of the athletics program. Most people within the school agreed that membership in the 
NAIA was no longer a viable option for the school. A campus administrator stated “It 
was clear we had to move away from the NAIA. We had simply outgrown it and our 
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president was not happy with some of the academic institutions that had been admitted 
to the division.” Campus administrators relished the idea of competing against schools 
that more represented their idea of where Birmingham Southern stood in the hierarchy of 
higher education. In May 1999, the Board of Trustees voted to move the school into 
Division I college athletics. 
 The school accepted an invitation to join the Big South Conference. This conference 
was comprised of both private and public medium sized schools located in the Carolinas 
and Virginia. One of the benefits of membership in the Big South Conference was that 
the winner of the conference basketball tournament received an invitation to the NCAA 
basketball tournament. School administrators liked the idea of the national exposure the 
school would receive if the school won the conference tournament. An idea that was 
likely, given the school‟s rich basketball tradition. 
 Along with the increased exposure for the school, another reason for the move was 
the school‟s growing endowment. In the late 90‟s, fueled by the rise in the stock market, 
the endowment had grown to over 300 million dollars. The rise in the endowment 
allowed school administrators to take a look at options to increase visibility for the 
school from a branding perspective. Similar to other private universities, Birmingham 
Southern hoped to use this increase in visibility that Division I status would provide to 
boost student enrollment and donations. 
 Moving to Division I required a significant increase in the budget of the athletic 
department. In 2001, the first year in Division I, the athletic budget was 6.5 million 
dollars. The budget helped fund 116 scholarships. The capital improvements budget was 
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significantly increased to get the school in compliance with Division I standards. From 
1999 – 2001 the school invested 3.5 million dollars into improvements of existing 
athletic facilities. However, these investments came at a time when the schools 
endowment was growing because of a strong economy. This would prove to not always 
be the case. Because of the growing financial concerns, the Birmingham Southern Board 
of Trustees voted in May, 2006 to transition the college‟s intercollegiate athletics 
program from NCAA Division I to non scholarship Division III (Cole & Wagnon, 2007). 
The school cited both financial concerns and a desire to associate Birmingham Southern 
with peer liberal arts institutions as reasons for the move. 
Findings and Analysis  
 Data collected revealed five main themes regarding Birmingham Southern‟s move to 
non-scholarship Division III athletics from Division I competition: 1) unsubstantiated 
outcomes, 2) strained finances, 3) presidential leadership, and 4) perceived roles. This 
section will discuss the categories and the roles they played in the school‟s reclassifying 
athletics. 
Unsubstantiated Outcomes Regarding the Benefits of Division I Athletics 
 On the one hand, interviewees stated that the reason for the move to Division I was 
influenced by pressure from a select group of donors. Administrators, on the other hand, 
asserted that increased exposure was the reason they used to justify the move. 
Interviewees noted that the increase in exposure would come from the school‟s 
qualifying to participating in the NCAA Division I basketball tournament. These 
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administrators hoped that the institution‟s increased exposure would help increase the 
school‟s endowment and boost student enrollment. One faculty member noted 
We had outlived our usefulness in the NAIA, we needed to seek better 
competition. We thought we could combine the goal of competing at the 
NCAA Division I classification with a rebranding of the school. 
Ultimately, the first goal (increased exposure) was met but not the second 
(increase endowment and enrollment).” 
 
It was the belief of campus administrators that these goals pertaining to increasing the 
endowment and student enrollment were not being met by the move to Division I. 
 When asked why the new administration at the school would change course 
regarding the branding of the school after participating in Division I for only four years, 
a school administrator stated:  
The underlying reason was simply that we had four or five donors that thought 
bigger is better in regards to athletics. They were being disingenuous regarding 
the reasons for undertaking the move. The bottom line was we just could not 
afford to participate at the Division I level. It didn‟t work; there was no 
discernable increase in either donations or student enrollment. 
 
 President Pollick, whom replaced Dr. Berte in 2004, was quick to point out that 
enrollment actually increased when the school announced they would abandon Division 
I for Division III. While there is no data pointing out that the increase was due to the 
move to Division III, the school used some of the resources previously expended on 
athletics to recruit and fund academic scholarships. The incoming class in 2006, 
assembled before the move from Division I to III, included 326 students for a total 
undergraduate enrollment of 1,207. The year after the move was announced there were 
506 new students and a projected enrollment of 1,318 (Powers, 2007). 
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Social and Organizational Determinants 
 In an article published by the Harvard Business Review entitled Knowing When to 
Pull the Plug (1987) Staw & Ross state that “one way to reduce the commitment to a 
losing course of action is to replace those associated with the original policy or project 
(p.5).” By removing the executives that were responsible for the initial course of action 
an organization is eliminating some of the sources of commitment (Staw & Ross, 1987 
p.5). This was the case at Birmingham Southern, as current president and the chairman 
of the board of trustees were not in their positions when the decision was made to 
compete at the Division I level. Therefore, Pollick did not have to handle what scholars 
describe as “external justification” regarding escalation situations. 
 External justification is described as the need for decision makers to rationalize 
actions to other parties (Ross & Staw, 1993). In essence, when one person inherits a 
problem it is easier for that person to take action, because he/she does not have a vested 
interest in a particular direction of the project. As neither Dr. Pollick nor the primary 
leadership of the Board were involved in the original decision to reclassify the athletics 
program, they did not have a vested interest in adhering to what rapidly became a losing 
course of action for the college. As Drummond (1995) noted withdrawal was more likely 
in scenarios were there was low commitment and high perceived power. At the time of 
the decision to leave Division I Pollick was new to the school and thus had high 
perceived power and the school had only participated in Division I for a short period of 
time and thus had a low commitment. This coupled with an economic downturn which 
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negatively impact school finances allowed Pollick to not have to rationalize the decision 
to certain parties either outside or inside the college. 
 Another social determinant of commitment as described in the literature pertains to 
the desire not to lose face or credibility (Ross & Staw, 1986). Because of the relatively 
short period of time Birmingham Southern participated in Division I athletics this was 
not applicable. One of the main factors in reclassifying an athletics program is the 
embeddedness athletics has on individual college campus. In essence, due to their long 
history on campus these athletic programs become institutionalized. Previous escalation 
literature has shown a correspondence between institutionalization and de-escalation. 
Ross and Staw (1993) note that institutionalization is considered to be an organizational 
determinant. As Birmingham Southern had competed at the Division I level for a short 
period of time, institutionalization was not a factor. The school had simply not 
established itself as a full-fledged member of either the conference or Division I long 
enough to suffer any lasting effects of changing classifications. 
 One could argue, and indeed campus administrators did, that Birmingham Southern 
actually enhanced their academic reputation with the move by joining a Division III 
conference that was comprised of like minded institutions.  As an example, almost all 
the schools that participate in the SCAC have Phi Beta Kappa chapters, which serves as 
a point of ride with the school‟s administrators, faculty and alumni. Montealegre & Keil 
(2000) note that “it is not unreasonable to conclude that reframing, or redefining, the 
problem could be a useful tactic for promoting de-escalation (p.434).” By highlighting 
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the academic merits of the decision to move to Division III and adding a football 
program, Pollick successfully reframed the decision. 
Strained Finances 
 School administrators were careful to acknowledge the role of external stakeholders 
regarding the move to Division III athletics. One administrator stated “In order to get the 
board approval we had to frame the move to Division III from an economic argument 
not a philosophical one. In this part of the country a philosophical argument against 
Division I athletics is just not going to win.” The interviewee noted that the popularity of 
college sports, particularly football, in the South forced Birmingham Southern to define 
the argument in financial terms. 
 Pollick noted that the move to Division III would allow the school to discontinue 
subsides to the athletic department. This in turn would help the school shore up their 
increasingly precarious position regarding finances. Pollick stated “when the decision to 
move to Division I was made in 1999, the school‟s endowment was at record levels due 
to a strong stock market. That was not the case in 2004, and I could see little reason to 
spend 13% of our schools budget on 116 scholarships.” There was a belief among 
administrators interviewed that the Trustees in the previous administration had not been 
fully informed regarding the schools strained finances. 
 When trustees were presented with the proper financial information the decision to 
change classifications was easier. A top school administrator stated: 
The board of trustees was not fully aware how bad school finances were. The 
credit rating agency Moody‟s had downgraded our bonds. We were running a 6.5 
million dollar deficit. Not all of it was athletics. But a significant portion was 
because we could not cover the costs of participating in Division I athletics. We 
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had two choices regarding covering the deficits. One, we could undertake 
emergency fundraising or two, take it out of the endowment. Neither of these 
options was pleasant. 
 
 By moving to Division III, the school was able to significantly decrease the money 
allotted to athletics. Previously, the school had to subsidize the athletic department for 
any budget shortfalls. While those loses were acceptable during the strong economy of 
the late 1990‟s, they became less so during the economic slowdown in the early 2000‟s. 
School administrators had stated that moving athletics from Division I to Division III 
would decrease the athletic budget from 6.5 million dollars to 3.5 million. This 
projection was more acceptable to the school president and the board of trustees. A 
campus administrator noted: 
The economics of college athletics are simple. Very few schools make money. 
That being said, someone has to pay for the shortfall. The shortfall is almost 
always covered by the school‟s central fund. The current administration made a 
decision to stop covering the losses.  
 
Another administrator stated: 
The financial reality of us entering Division I never made economic sense. There 
was no long term solution regarding the question of how do we make Division I 
financially viable. A handful of donors agreed to basically provide the seed 
money for the initial move to Division I, but we did not ask for a long range 
financial commitment from them after that seed money was gone. When an 
athletic department is not self-sustaining, the fate of athletics is left to university 
leaders. 
 
The consensus among those interviewed was that the school simply did not have the 
financial resources to compete in Division I and needed to reassess the direction of the 
athletic department. They also thought they had the president to implement those 
changes. 
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 Dr. Pollick and the chairman of the Board of Trustees made what can be described as 
an economic conventional wisdom argument to the school‟s board of trustees. After 
reviewing the facts regarding the institution‟s and the athletic department‟s financial 
records it was clear that the school could not continue to devote financial resources to a 
Division I athletic program. The financial situation at the school “acted as the kind of 
shock which Staw and Ross (1987) have suggested may be necessary to galvanize 
decision makers into action (Drummond, 1995 p. 277).” 
 Since the school did not sponsor a football program at the Division I level and the 
basketball program only participated for a short time at this classification political 
support played a limited role in the decision of Birmingham Southern to reclassify. This 
does not mean to imply that everyone was happy with the decision to move to Division 
III, to the contrary. Some board members felt that the school had not participated at the 
Division I level long enough to properly judge the benefits of this level of competition. 
Included in this group were trustees that had donated significant dollars to the upgrade of 
athletic facilities at the school. These same trustees were not pleased that they had not 
been consulted on the move to Division III.  Most of the trustees that were unhappy with 
the move eventually left the board. 
Presidential Leadership 
 It is an old adage that the quickest way to kill an idea on a college campus is to form 
a committee to study the issue. Previous attempts to reclassify athletics at other 
institutions have failed when committees were formed. Birmingham Southern‟s 
administrators were determined to avoid the forming of a committee to study 
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reclassifying the athletic department. Pollick noted that there is always inertia against 
change on a college campus. During an interview with the author, Dr. Pollick stated:  
Typically when administrators of nonprofit entities cannot deal with the 
specifics of a problem they attack the process. I worried that the forming 
of a committee would lead to issues being discussed that had little to do 
with the subject matter. That is just how higher education works. Often 
times we defer on the tough questions. 
 
Pollick was determined to address the issue only with select members of the board or 
trustees. He stated: “I‟m on my third college presidency. It‟s very clear in my mind what 
our institution stands for and what level our athletics program we should be participating 
in.” 
 Dr. Pollick asked that the board reach a decision within 90 days to avoid the standard 
institutional course of action which is to form a committee to further study the issue of 
reclassifying an athletics department. One campus administrator stated: 
This is especially true when dealing with big time college athletics where the 
media has strong influence. On a college campus the quickest way to not do 
something is to form a committee. When a committee is formed your opposition 
has time to build a case. 
 
 Pollick explained that one of the major reasons why the school was able to 
successfully move from Division I was because the decision making process involved a 
relatively small group of individuals. Pollick stated “I took my initial findings to the 
Chair of the Board of Trustees, after he reviewed my concerns he polled a small group of 
Trustees and the decision was made to proceed.” Campus administrators interviewed 
discussed the recent reclassifying attempts at Centenary College, Rice University and 
Tulane University. Only Centenary was successful in reclassifying their athletic program 
to Division III status. In the case of Rice and Tulane, attempts ended when the schools 
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formed committees to study the issue. One interviewee noted “this gave time for the 
Division I supporters to marshal resources, mainly through the media, to stop the 
reclassifying efforts.” 
 To win faculty support it was essential that the school align itself with institutions 
with similar missions. This was not easy considering the lack of Division III conferences 
in the South. Dr. Pollick stated “through some back channels we called various Division 
III conferences to see if there would be interest in having Birmingham Southern College 
as a member of that particular conference.” One campus administrator noted “the key to 
the whole move was finding a conference that fit both our schools mission and was also 
geographically suitable for our student-athletes.”  This administrator credited Pollick 
with understanding the political aspect of reclassification. The key to gaining admission 
in a good Division III conference was football. 
 With the money saved from the move to Division III the school was able to reinstate 
the football program. Part of the reinstatement of the sport was due to the desire to join 
the Southern Collegiate Athletic Conference. The addition of football was considered 
important regarding admittance to the SCAC, where the majority of member schools 
sponsor the sport. One interviewee stated that “adding football was a good move for the 
school. It plays an important role on college campus‟ in the South and I believe helped 
us get into a good Division III conference.” 
 The general feeling among school administrators was that the addition of football 
would help ease political forces that might oppose reclassification. One faculty member 
interviewed stated “I always thought that adding football was a smart way for the 
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administration to placate students and alumni regarding the move to Division III, it also 
helps that at the non-scholarship Division III classification all student athletes including 
football players are paying to attend your college.” Another faculty member noted “the 
key arguments against the move were that we had just invested millions in new athletic 
facilities to get up to Division I standards and he (Pollick) just doesn‟t like sports. With 
the addition of football and a plan to use the new facilities for Division II athletics he 
countered those arguments.” 
 Another main factor in escalation situations is the role of reinforcement traps. “As 
Platt (1973) and March (1978) argued, those who have advanced to top leadership 
positions may be prone to reinforcement traps, situations in which people assume, 
because of their histories of success, that losing courses of action will turn around (Ross 
& Staw, 1993 p.716).” School administrators at Birmingham Southern were guilty of 
these traps as well. As an example, these administrators allowed a small group of donors 
to effectively decide the direction of the school‟s athletic programs. These donors had 
previously been quite successful in making decisions (along with the president) that 
allowed the school to become a nationally ranked liberal arts college. Research shows 
that people often bias facts toward an outcome they prefer (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). In the 
case of Birmingham Southern there were clearly mistakes in the information processing 
involving moving from NAIA to NCAA Division I classification. Recall the situation in 
which the Board of Trustees was led to believe that the move to Division I would led to 
increases in student enrollment and endowment funds. In essence, school administrators 
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allowed themselves to believe what they wanted to believe regarding the benefits of 
Division I membership. 
 The decision to move from NAIA to NCAA Division I came at the end of the most 
prosperous era (financially and academically) in school history. The school‟s 
administrators had a prolonged and steady tenure at the school which made them 
susceptible to reinforcement traps. In other words this finding is in line with Ross and 
Staw, (1993) in which they state, “With such a personal reinforcement history, it may 
have been difficult for him to conceive of a course of action not eventually being 
successful (p.716).” In retrospect, the school was guilty of an overstatement of the 
benefits of a move to Division I. Put simply, school administrators wanted the move to 
work out so they chose to look at the facts that would reinforce that outcome. When the 
benefits of Division I did not materialize school administrators were forced to either 
continue funding athletic programs at a classification the school could not afford or 
admit a decision making error and reclassify athletics to the non scholarship Division III 
level. 
 Escalation literature has found that many firms retained unprofitable business units 
with steadily mounting losses for years without divesting them (Shimizu & Hitt, 2005). 
As an example, Certo, Connelly, & Tihanyi (2008) note that “in several cases the arrival 
of outside executives, who were not involved in the initial acquisition decision, was 
needed to hasten divestiture of the failing division (p. 11).” This was certainly true in 
Birmingham Southern‟s case where the arrival of a new school president – Dr. Pollick – 
started the discussion about the move to Division III. As a former college president at 
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two small schools, Dr. Pollick brought a working knowledge of higher education and 
athletics at the Division III level. As an outsider to the university he was not tied to the 
course of action (the move to Division I) that was decided prior to his arrival. 
 Recently, Rice University and Tulane University studied the feasibility of 
reclassifying their athletic departments. These attempts ended when both institutions 
decided to remain in the Division I classification (Rice Report 2004, Tulane Report 
2003). Campus administrators at Birmingham Southern acknowledged how the situation 
at both Rice and Tulane played a part in shaping their decision making process. It was 
their belief that the forming of committees played a significant role in both schools 
remaining at the Division I level. Dr. Pollick was determined not to let that happen at 
Birmingham Southern and was unequivocal in stating the most important factor in 
making the decision to reclassify the athletics program was the fact that the initial 
decision making process was simply him and select board members. This decision 
making process eliminated any organizational inertia that might have existed had the 
decision required committee approval. In de-escalation scenarios the perception of 
power is often a persuasive strategy. Previous de-escalation literature has noted that 
“withdrawal is most probable under conditions of low commitment and high perceived 
power to enact withdrawal (Drummond 1995, p.278).” Because of the brief time period 
the school was a member of Division I the faculty and campus administrators had a low 
commitment to the classification. Dr. Pollick used his authority to better align athletics 
to the central mission of a liberal arts institution. 
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Perceived Role of a Small Liberal Arts Institution 
 “One of the things we considered in the decision (to reclassify to Division III) was 
which athletics division is indeed the right fit for an institution of our size, of our 
academic mission and quality, and of our financial resources,” then BSC Board of 
Trustees Chair James T Stephens said at the time. “Division III is compatible with the 
college‟s mission and profile (Cole & Wagnon, 2007).”  It was apparent from the 
interviews that while the economics of Division I was given as the central reason for the 
move, the current administration had differing views regarding the mission of a liberal 
arts college from the previous administration. 
 As previously mentioned, to win faculty support it was essential that the school align 
itself with institutions with similar missions. This was not easy considering the lack of 
Division III conferences in the South. Dr. Pollick stated “through some back channels 
we called various Division III conferences to see if there would be interest in having 
Birmingham Southern College as a member of that particular conference.” One campus 
administrator noted “the key to the whole move was finding a conference that fit both 
our schools mission and was also geographically suitable for our student-athletes.” 
 Once firmly committed to Division III athletics, Birmingham Southern found a home 
in the Southern Collegiate Athletic Conference. The SCAC is comprised of private 
colleges of high academic distinction located mostly in the Southern part of the country. 
Members include Rhodes College, Centre College, DePauw College and Trinity College. 
Almost all the member schools have Phi Beta Kappa chapters. One faculty member 
stated “having a Phi Beta Kappa chapter on this campus is incredibly important to this 
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school and the accreditation process.” In Pollick‟s opinion this classification and this 
conference would better position the college, both athletically and academically, for the 
future. 
 Project determinants often include closing cost, sunk cost, and the economic merits 
of pursuing or dropping the course of action (Ross & Staw, 1993). Previous literature 
regarding escalation has noted that the financial and economic structure of a project can 
determine whether an organization will persist or withdraw from a situation (Ross & 
Staw, 1986). 
 Evaluating Birmingham Southern‟s decision to abandon Division I on these merits 
we can begin to understand the school‟s decision from a de-escalation perspective. The 
closing cost for the decision to leave Division I for Division III consisted of the school 
agreeing to honor all scholarships to student-athletes for four years. The school felt that 
this was only fair as these student athletes signed a scholarship with Birmingham 
Southern thinking that they would participate in Division I athletics. This cost was made 
easier by the decision of most student-athletes in all sports to transfer to other Division I 
schools. The school also agreed to honor all coaches‟ contracts. These costs are what 
academic scholars would call a one-time write-off and went a long way towards 
ameliorating the financial strain on the school. 
 In college athletics most sunk cost reside in facilities. Sunk costs are defined as cost 
that cannot be recovered once they are incurred (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). Ross and Staw 
(1993) note that sunk costs suggest that investing money in physical structures usually 
indicates a willingness to invest additional funds. This was not the case at Birmingham 
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Southern where facilities proved to be an asset. Because of the move to Division I the 
school had invested 3.5 million dollars in capital cost to upgrade their facilities. The 
capital investments would have been a larger issue had the school dropped athletics 
altogether; thus, the facilities would be obsolete. Previous de-escalation literature notes 
that project redirection is a form of de-escalation. Montealegre & Keil (2000) state 
“while redirection cannot guarantee that the project will be successful, it does signal a 
reduction in commitment in response to a failing course of action (p.418).” The move 
away from Division I, allowed the school to simply redirect resources, in this case 
facilities, for Division III use. 
 When discussing the role played by project determinants scholars note the 
importance of reliable financial information in stopping an escalating situation. 
Interviewees were unequivocally stated that the Board of Trustees were not given the 
necessary facts regarding either the full costs of operating a Division I program or the 
financial health of the school. “Northcraft and Neale (1986) showed, clear and salient 
financial information may be necessary for decision makers to withdraw from a losing 
course of action (Ross & Staw, 1993 p.715).” Once the board was given the correct 
information the decision was made to reclassify. 
Organizational Exit 
A Strategic Plan for Reclassification 
 How does a college president address and act upon the sensitive question regarding 
athletic department reclassification? For incoming Birmingham Southern President 
David Pollick it started with a simple question: Why is the school spending 13% of the 
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schools operating budget on less than 200 students? Although one could argue that 
Birmingham Southern students enjoyed the increased exposure afforded the school 
because of participating in Division I, Dr. Pollick believed the high percentage of the 
schools budget devoted to subsidizing athletics could be better spent on academic 
scholarships. Devoting financial resources to academic scholarships would serve to 
better fulfill the school‟s mission. 
 Pollick believed the money could be better spent on recruiting and awarding 
academic scholarships to qualified students. By devoting more money to academic 
scholarships the school and it‟s student would all benefit. However, Pollick was not 
naïve to the need for a strategic plan regarding what was sure to be a controversial plan. 
The strategic plan revolved around faculty support, media, and the addition of football. 
 In the case of Birmingham Southern, the administration recognized that because of 
its Division I classification the media was going to become a stakeholder. Freeman 
(1984) states “a stakeholder in an organization (by definition) any group or individual 
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization‟s objectives (p.46).” 
As is often the case in college athletics, Birmingham Southern‟s decision to reclassify an 
athletic program to Division I status became a major story. The subsequent decision to 
abandon Division I athletics for non scholarship Division III became an even bigger 
story in the national, regional, and local news. 
 In the national press, legendary sports writer Frank Deford (2007) praised Dr. Pollick 
for standing up for academics at a time when schools were putting unprecedented 
financial resources into their athletic programs (Fulks, 2009). Deford, who once 
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commented that Alabama was “the holy epicenter of college sport” admired Pollick‟s 
stance on such a tough decision. The local press took a different tone and the president 
was vilified as a carpet bagging academic that cared little for athletics. Pollick would 
later state that not one local sports writer called him to ask him his reasons for the move. 
He added that the first reporter to call was from the business section of the Birmingham 
News. 
 As Division I athletics continue to move further towards a delineation between the 
haves and the have nots the decision regarding which NCAA athletic classification 
institutions ought to participate in continues to grow. The classification that schools 
choose is heightened by higher education‟s precarious funding in tough economic times. 
The main strategy Birmingham Southern administrators used in de-escalating it athletic 
program was based on an economic argument. In part because of the economic 
downturn, the school simply could not continue to subsidize Division I athletics. 
 When debating the merits of the various classifications offered by either the NCAA 
or NAIA it is imperative for campus administrators to take a look at the viability of 
financial success. If athletics are not going to be financially feasible, campus 
administrators need to understand that the difference between what an athletic 
department costs to operate and what revenues that department generates is more often 
than not going to be augmented by the  institutions central funds. However, using the 
university‟s central funds to cover athletic expenses when academic programs are being 
cut is a difficult argument to make. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A CASE STUDY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
 The decision on where to position a university‟s athletic department, either within 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) or conference affiliation, is one 
that college administrators have faced for years. This decision is particularly difficult for 
academically prestigious and highly selective institutions. Many schools rationalize the 
escalation in expenditures on athletics because their athletic programs act as a “window 
to the university”. This is not necessarily the case at highly selective universities. Often 
these universities, such as Harvard, MIT, Yale and Stanford have formidable academic 
reputations that serve to promote the school. 
 While there is a significant amount of literature on escalation and its effect on 
organizations there has been a paucity of research conducted on organizations that utilize 
de-escalation strategies. This paper will examine the tensions between shifting academic 
visions and athletics that ultimately led to the decision by the University of Chicago and 
its former president, Robert Hutchins to discontinue its highly successful football 
program in an effort to explicitly focus the institution‟s mission on what he considered to 
be its core function. This decision came at a time when intercollegiate football was 
growing as a spectator sport and the University of Chicago was a member of one of the 
most prestigious athletic conferences, the Big Ten which is comprised of large 
Midwestern research universities. This was the modern day equivalent of Stanford 
University dropping out of the Pac 10 conference a move that would be unheard of and 
impossible today. As one of a select few schools that abandoned football while being a 
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member of a major athletic conference the University of Chicago is a unique situation 
that warrants examination. 
 Unlike many small, private institutions that still compete in Division I athletics, such 
as Stanford, Rice and Vanderbilt, the University of Chicago chose to take a different 
route regarding its football program. The study will focus on the internal and external 
factors that played a key role in the University of Chicago‟s decision and will illustrate 
how a highly selective school was able to maintain academic excellence, without using 
the visibility of football to accomplish this goal. While most large research focused 
institutions continue to rely on successful athletic programs for visibility and “prestige”, 
the University of Chicago, under the leadership of President Hutchins, made a conscious 
decision to focus solely on improving its academic reputation at the expenses of its 
football program. The institution‟s decision maintained its intellectual prestige; yet, 
questions remain about whether the decision was necessary to keep its reputation intact. 
 Despite its abolishment of football in 1939 and the reclassification of all its 
intercollegiate athletic programs to non scholarship status a decade later, the University 
of Chicago currently ranks among the countries elite institutions. U. S. News and World 
Report magazine currently ranks the schools undergraduate, business school, law school, 
statistics and mathematics departments among the top ten programs in the country. 
Additionally, the schools physics, chemistry and medical school rank in the top fifteen 
among all programs in the country (U.S. News and World Report, 2010). Although the 
University of Chicago was a founding member of the Big Ten conference the school‟s 
academic programs consistently rank higher than any current member of the conference. 
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This article will demonstrate how one university abandoned intercollegiate football, and 
all the supposed gains that come from it, and maintained its status as an academically 
prestigious institution that does not rely on college athletics to promote its reputation for 
scholarly excellence. The implications of this research will show that it is possible for 
schools to abandon Division I football and still maintain high academic standards. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which such a drastic move would be necessary is unclear. 
 This study will begin by providing a historical overview of college athletics in the 
early 1900‟s and its place within a highly selective university. After offering the problem 
statement and research questions, a discussion about both the literature involving 
escalation and de-escalation theory will be explored. Escalation of Commitment theory 
states that organizations that continue to invest resources in a course of action despite 
negative consequences are involved in escalating behavior (Staw, 1976). Following this, 
a discussion about the methodology used in this paper and a presentation of a case study 
of the University of Chicago and its decision to abandon Division I football will be 
examined. Next, some historical themes gathered from the data will be compared against 
a framework that has been used in previous de-escalation studies. Finally, this paper will 
conclude by providing the reader with some ideas involving this theory and its 
application to intercollegiate athletics, particularly to small, private universities. 
Intercollegiate Athletics as a Growth Industry 
 The early 1900‟s were a major growth era for college football (Cohen, 1998). Prior 
to this, athletics had been a student controlled activity. “In the new environment, 
institutional control came to replace student control (Flowers 2007 p.128).” As an 
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example, Flowers notes that “college presidents came to accept athletics as an integral 
part of the college, something which created in the public mind a viable institution – a 
real university (Flowers 2007 p.129).” In this era, athletics was used by universities to 
“join the alumni to the institution, sustaining their loyalty and, not incidentally, their 
donations (Cohen 1998 p.122).” 
 It was also during this era that many schools began partnering with peer institutions 
to form alliances. These alliances would eventually become athletic conferences. The 
conferences were important to schools who were trying to associate their institutions 
with like minded institutions. The initial president of the University of Chicago, William 
Rainey Harper, was one of the first academic leaders to view school‟s athletic teams as a 
way to garner publicity for the institution. Harper wanted to build a world class 
university in all academics areas and promote them via athletics. 
 This attitude changed when Robert Maynard Hutchins became the president of the 
school in 1929. Hutchins was not pleased with the way football was conducted at the 
national level and more specifically at the University of Chicago. As an example, 
Hutchins believed that recruiting students that were unprepared to handle rigorous  
academic coursework was hurting the undergraduate reputation of the university. An 
educational puritan at heart Hutchins believed that as long as the school had a first rate 
academic program it would have no problem attracting both students and faculty. 
Harper‟s argument that a university needed athletics to serve as a public relations 
mechanism for the school was not shared by President Hutchins. 
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 By joining primarily with large state universities that placed a strong emphasis on 
research the University of Chicago hoped to increase the visibility of the school. This 
paper will examine the internal and external struggles that the administration 
encountered during the time period that the University of Chicago made the decision to 
abandon intercollegiate football. The following questions were used to guide data 
collection and focus this paper on certain themes. 
1) What are the factors that influenced the University of Chicago‟s decision to 
discontinue long-term investments in its football program? 
2) What role does the internal and external environment play in the institution‟s 
decision to discontinue investing in their football program? 
3) What are the historical implications of a major research university abandoning 
Division I scholarship football. 
Review of Literature 
 Escalation of Commitment is a theory - developed by Barry Staw (1976) - that 
primarily states that in many instances individuals (and organizations) can become 
locked into a costly course of action (Staw, 1981). Staw (1976) demonstrated that when 
individuals were personally responsible for a failing course of action, they often 
increased their investment instead of withdrawing and accepting a loss. Rational 
behavior suggests that “one would expect individuals to reverse decisions or to change 
behaviors which result in negative consequences (Staw, 1976 p.27).” Escalation of 
commitment theory shows that this is not always true. Or as management scholar Helga 
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Drummund succinctly states “persistence in the face of a stream of losses is known as 
escalation (Drummond, 1996).” 
 Little research has been conducted on organizations that initiate de-escalation 
initiatives. The previous research that has been conducted consists of studying de-
escalation in laboratory settings. Two de-escalation studies in field based research 
settings are Montealegre & Keil‟s (2000) examination of de-escalation within an 
information technology context at the Denver International Airport and Keil & Robey‟s 
(1999) exploration regarding a troubled software project. I utilize these studies as my 
conceptual framework. 
 In their article entitled, Turning around Troubled Software Projects: An Exploratory 
Study of the De-escalation of Commitment to Failing Course of Action (1999) Keil & 
Robey identify key factors in organizations that are de-escalating troubled projects. This 
article discussed troubled software projects and the “effectiveness of managerial actions 
taken to turn around or redirect such projects (p.63).” The article states that a key 
component to turning around troubled projects is for management to recognize problems 
and prepare to take corrective action. 
 Further research regarding de-escalation by Montealegre and Keil (2000) examined a 
recently implemented IT based baggage handling system at the Denver International 
Airport. Their study sought to “understand the process of de-escalation and to establish a 
model for turning around troubles projects that had both theoretical and practical 
significance (p.417).” This paper showed that de-escalation was a four-phased process, 
consisting of 1) problem recognition, 2) re-examination of prior courses of action, 3) 
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search for alternative courses of action, and 4) the implementation of an exit strategy. 
The phases help explain the key activities that comprise de-escalation. 
 Another study on de-escalation was undertaken by management scholar Helga 
Drummond (1995). This study dealt with the dissolution of a law partnership and 
showed the importance of power and timing in de-escalation situations. In this study, the 
disadvantages of the partnership manifest themselves quickly. This forces the subject to 
make a decision on staying in what is correctly perceived as a losing course of action. 
Drummond (1995) states the sooner negative feedback emerges the likelihood of 
withdrawal is increased. This shows that the timing of negative feedback is critical. 
De-escalation in a University Athletics Department 
 I use Escalation of Commitment theory to explore the situation at the University of 
Chicago in the early 1900‟s. The University of Chicago was chosen for a number of 
reasons. Although many universities have dropped their athletic programs to lower 
classifications with the NCAA, the University of Chicago is unique in that it is a highly 
selective university that was a founding member of one of the top athletic conferences in 
the country yet chose to abandoned scholarship football. 
 I will draw a comparison between this theory‟s application in foreign policy and 
business to a private institution‟s athletic program.  This study will focus on 
organizational-level de-escalation at a select university which struggled for years to 
define athletics within the institution and then took the unprecedented step in abolishing 
football. This was done despite the fact that there are a number of highly selective 
universities that still compete in Division I athletics. Ross and Staw (1993) note that 
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“since escalation research is as much concerned with how organizations get out of losing 
courses of action as with how those courses expand over time, it is important to examine 
projects that are not self-terminating.” Studying de-escalation at the University of 
Chicago is a perfect scenario because it is the only school that competed in a major 
Division I conference to completely abandoned scholarship football. 
Method 
 Data for this paper were collected through a thorough document analysis process 
from documents primarily gathered from the Department of Special Collections at the 
University of Chicago. Because this study focuses on a situation that happened in the 
early 1900‟s a document analysis was the most appropriate research method. Data 
analysis focused on providing a historical assessment of the events that took place at the 
University of Chicago. Patton (2002) states that documents are “written materials and 
other documents from organizational, clinical, or programs records; memoranda and 
correspondence; official publications and reports; personal diaries, letters, artistic works, 
photographs, and memorabilia; and written responses to open-ended surveys (p.293).” 
Documents for this study consisted of peer reviewed academic journal articles, college 
dissertations, papers of William Rainey Harper and Amos Alonzo Stagg, and historical 
books about Harper, Hutchins and Stagg. These documents provided a through 
description of the events at the University of Chicago. Although a qualitative document 
analysis is interpretive by nature I focused on the historical aspects that were well 
documented. 
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 These data helped me gain valuable information regarding both the athletic 
department and the university during the time period studied. Patton (2002) continues by 
noting “records, documents, artifacts, and archives – what has traditionally been called 
“material culture” in anthropology – constitute a particularly rich source of information 
about many organizations and programs (p.293).” Data presented here consist of 
excerpts from documents captured in a way that records and preserves context. 
Reviewing these documents was important not only for the information yielded but 
because they helped me find other paths of inquiry that were beneficial. 
 A secondary source of data consisted of four interviews with authors of books 
regarding the subject matter and with retired university faculty members. These 
individuals were chosen because of their specific knowledge of the subject matter. Four 
interviews were conducted for this research. Two subjects were interviewed once and 
one subject was interviewed twice. One of the interviewees had written his PhD 
dissertation on the subject, which was later developed into a popular press book. The 
other two interviewees were retired history and sport studies professors who had done 
academic research regarding the subject matter. These interviews were conducted over 
the phone and averaged between 30 - 45 minutes in length. By asking semi-structured 
questions I was able to get subject to expand on their initial answer. Additional sources 
of information consisted of newspaper articles, mainstream books on higher education 
during the time period researched, and academic articles were used to develop 
background knowledge of the subject matter. 
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 I began data collection by reviewing published articles in the mainstream press 
regarding the University of Chicago‟s decision to abolish football. This allowed me to 
develop an understanding of the situation. I visited the University of Chicago‟s libraries 
on two separate occasions and gathered data from documents located in the university 
archives. After these visits I interviewed subjects that had a working knowledge of the 
subject matter. These interviewees included an academic whose PhD dissertation on the 
subject of athletics at the University of Chicago had been turned into a popular press 
book and academics who had written peer reviewed articles on the subject. 
Case Study Methodology 
 The information will be presented to the reader in the form of a historical case study.  
Stake (1995) notes “a case study is the study of the particularity and complexity of a 
single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances.” Yin 
(2003) suggests that the case study is “the method of choice when the phenomenon 
under study is not readily distinguishable for its context (p.4).” Because of the numerous 
stakeholders involved in decisions regarding university athletics and the broader context 
that athletics plays in our society the case study is an appropriate method in which to 
study the University of Chicago. Previous de-escalation research has noted that case 
studies allow researchers to observe de-escalation behavior in a natural setting 
(Montealegre & Keil 2000). Observing de-escalation strategies in a historical setting 
provided insight into the dynamics of a university athletic department and the 
stakeholders that influence behavior. 
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 The case study is used because of a lack of field based experiments regarding de-
escalation. Yin (1984) further defines the case study research method as “an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used (p.5).” 
Limitations 
 Because the events that I explore took place in the early 1900‟s I was limited to the 
material that had been preserved in the university archives. Supplementary data 
information came from authors who had written books about the university and its 
athletic program. These individuals were invaluable in providing useful information that 
provided background regarding the main actors. While there was ample information 
available regarding this subject matter there was also information that was surely lost 
due to the time lapse between the actions discussed and the writing of this paper. While 
this paper explores how one private university dealt with escalation involving athletics in 
the early 1900‟s, it is noted that all universities have vastly different viewpoints 
regarding the benefits and drawbacks derived from athletics. 
Background of the University of Chicago 
 The University of Chicago was founded in 1891 by its benefactor, oil magnate John 
D. Rockefeller. The motto of the university is Crescat scientia; vita excolatur. Latin for: 
Let knowledge grow from more to more; and so be human life enriched. History has 
documented that Rockefeller was “a man of conscience who strove to be both a good 
churchman and a good businessman (Storr, 1966).” Frederick Rudolph stated that “no 
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episode was more important in shaping the outlook and expectations of American 
Higher Education….than the founding of the University of Chicago, one of those events 
in American history that brought into focus the spirit of the age (Lester, 1999).” This 
was due to Rockefeller‟s unprecedented donation and the recruitment of world class 
scholars. 
 It owes its prestige to an undergraduate curriculum that emulates a liberal arts 
college and a research institution modeled after the German system. Over the years it has 
been affiliated with 82 Nobel Prize laureates and a leader in the development of modern 
physics. It was the university‟s physics department that developed the world‟s first man-
made, self-sustaining nuclear reaction. However, the history of the university can be 
chronicled in the story of two of its past presidents, William Rainey Harper and Robert 
Maynard Hutchins, and its iconic head football coach, Amos Alonzo Stagg.  
 These two presidents and the school‟s football coach played an integral part in the 
development of higher education in the country and the role that athletics plays on a 
college campus. In an article published in the Journal of Sport History Lawson and 
Ingham (1980) analyzed three areas where Harper, Hutchins, and Stagg intercepted at 
the University of Chicago. These areas were: 
In the founding in 1892 of an institution of higher education which Harper 
envisioned would be the prototype of a service station genre of modern urban 
universities, 2) in the evolution of physical education and athletics in this 
institution; and 3) in the struggle which eventuated between Hutchins and Stagg 
when the former strived to reverse many of the programs that Harper had 
initiated, among them being intercollegiate football and the requirement in 
physical culture (p.39).” 
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This article explores the relationship between Harper, Hutchins and Stagg in what would 
become a precursor of the interplay between college presidents and head coaches that 
many schools would find themselves in regarding intercollegiate athletics. 
Findings and Analysis 
 Four main factors played a role in the de-escalating of athletics at the University of 
Chicago: 1) Change in Presidents, 2) Shifting Academic Visions, 3) Athletic Department 
Finances, and 4) Change in Coaches. This section will discuss these categories and the 
role they played in this study. 
Change in Presidents 
 In the beginning, John D. Rockefeller hired William Rainey Harper to establish the 
best university west of the Mississippi. He instructed President Harper to recruit the best 
and brightest to serve as deans at the school. The faculty that Harper would eventually 
recruit would be comprised of nine former presidents or seminary leaders (Lester, 1999). 
After Harper assembled his faculty he would remark “It‟s not a very good university, it‟s 
only the best there is.” 
 Although an academic by training Harper was well versed in the need to promote the 
university. “Harper was the perhaps the first American university administrator to grasp 
fully the educational and philanthropic possibilities of physical education and football 
(Lester, 1999).” What cannot be denied is that Harper realized the importance of 
publicity for a young institution. He would use this publicity created by the football 
program to draw attention to all Chicago academic departments and promote the 
school‟s reputation as a first rate academic institution. Harper was not the only member 
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of the faculty to express interest in intercollegiate athletics as a promotional tool for the 
university. “Albion W. Small, sometime college president and head of the sociology 
department, expressed the same idea: “… athletic sports in our colleges are among the 
most important moralizing influences at our disposal (Storr, 1966 p.179).” 
 The history of the University of Chicago and intercollegiate athletics are tightly 
intertwined. When the school was first opened in 1891 President Harper ensured that 
athletics would be a central part of the school by hiring Amos Alonzo Stagg. Stagg, a 
graduate of Yale University, was hired not just as a football coach but as an associate 
professor in the Department of Physical Culture. “Stagg was not – as custom elsewhere 
indicated – a coach hired by an autonomous athletic association to produce winning 
teams but a professor appointed by the University to carry to success a segment of its 
own program (Storr, 1966 p.180).” This move insured him tenured status and was 
designed to better integrate athletics into the overall mission of the university. As a 
reminder, the mission of the school was to serve as a modern research university.  
 Prior to assuming the presidency at Chicago, Harper had been a professor at Yale 
where Stagg was one of his top students. The hiring of Stagg fit neatly into the plans of 
Harper to establish Chicago as a premier institution of higher learning in what was then 
the western part of the United States.  Together, Stagg and Harper would use football to 
promote the school to both the city and the country. This promoting was accomplishing 
through radio broadcasts and newsreel highlights and was used to engage the public in 
Harper‟s idea of an American university (Lester, 1999). This strategy would prove 
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effective until the university named Robert Maynard Hutchins as the president of the 
University of Chicago, who was appointed in 1929. 
 Prior to the presidency he has served as dean of Yale Law School. The son of a 
former college president, Hutchins set out to establish his legacy at the university. That 
legacy would involve trying to change the undergraduate curriculum, dealing with a 
university that was constantly strapped for funds and abolishing varsity football.  
 Previous de-escalation research has noted that a change in top leadership of a project 
is often needed to force a change in a given course of action. The de-escalation literature 
notes that “for a variety of psychological, social, and organizational reasons, top 
management may maintain its commitment to projects that are deeply troubled (Keil & 
Robey 2000 p.67).” This was especially true at the University of Chicago. When Harper 
was president of the school he had a plan to use football (and athletics) to promote the 
mission and vision of the school. This philosophy changed when faculty voted to de-
emphasize physical education and mandate that university athletics be pursued at the 
intramural level. 
 As in any university setting, the president‟s voice is but one of many. In the Chicago 
case, Hutchins and the Board of Trustees worked hard to marshal support of both faculty 
and other university stakeholders. For the most part, alumni supported the move out of 
scholarship football. One trustee estimated that “eighty percent of the 47,000 alumni 
were outspoken in favor of the break (Lester, 1999 p192).” 
 Hutchins used articles like the one in the Saturday Evening Post to win support of 
alumni and the public. This was done to speak directly to a large number of alumni 
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which Hutchins understood to be stakeholders in the university. By appealing to these 
stakeholders through certain media outlets Hutchins was able to win the support of the 
majority of alumni as well as current students. 
Shifting Academic Visions 
 Prior to the arrival of Hutchins, there had been concern at the university regarding 
the undergraduate college. The University of Chicago graduate schools still were among 
the nations‟ finest, but campus administrators had grown concerned with the place of the 
undergraduate college. To combat this problem Deans Wilkins and Boucher authored 
what came to be known as the “New Plan”. This plan was in the works during Hutchins 
inauguration in 1929. 
 President Hutchins had a vastly different viewpoint of the mission of the university 
than Harper. “Hutchins fundamental point of departure rested in the assumption that a 
university‟s principle function should be to provide intellectual leadership in society 
(Lawson & Ingham 1980, p.49).” In his book The Higher Learning of America (1936) 
Hutchins outlined one of the sources of problems with higher education. This problem 
consisted of “the love of money” which forced the university to „sell its soul.” “And in 
order to make themselves attractive to students, donors, and legislation, thereby to 
acquire money, institutions tended to emphasize social life, character building, and 
athletics, all of which led to a debasement of these institutions and to a confusion of their 
purposes (Lawson & Ingham 1980 p.50).” 
 During Hutchins initial years at the school the faculty passed a revised curriculum 
known as the “New Plan”. This plan called for revisions in the undergraduate portion of 
107 
 
the curriculum. Specifically, the plan instituted comprehensive exams after the students 
second year and before the student could enter the specialized portion of their degree 
plan. Another not so insignificant move was the abolishment of physical culture as an 
undergraduate requirement. This move dealt a blow to Stagg who wanted to use the 
physical culture requirement to recruit and retain athletes. “In losing the physical culture 
requirement, Stagg had seen his player development system dismantled (Lawson & 
Ingham 1980 p.52).” 
 A separate “uncommissioned” report, authored by Dr. Dudley Reed, the Health 
Officer of the University of Chicago, “proposed that a premium be placed on health and 
enjoyment and suggested that intramurals be elevated over commercialized athletics 
with its “win at all costs” ethic (Lawson & Ingham 1980 p.52).” The proposal, which 
was endorsed by Hutchins, showed just how far the visions of Hutchins and Harper 
diverged. Hutchins viewpoint was made clear in this statement he made: 
I hope that it is not necessary for me to tell you that this is an educational 
institution, that education is primarily concerned with the training of the mind, 
and that athletics and social life, though they may contribute to it, are not the 
heart of it and cannot be permitted to interfere with it (Lawson & Ingham 1980 
p.59). 
 
 During his time as President of the school Hutchins used the media to strengthen his 
position regarding athletics place in the university. In an article published in the 
Saturday Evening Post entitled “Gate Receipts and Glory” Hutchins noted that “ 
physical education might have a place in higher learning, but he attacked what he termed 
the “myths of Athleticism” that were a part of intercollegiate athletics (Lester 1999 
p.163).” 
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 One of President Hutchin‟s goals was to reemphasize undergraduate education. The 
decline of the football program coincided with the schools decision to reemphasis 
undergraduate education at the school. Prior to Hutchins arrival, school administrators 
and faculty at the university felt that their undergraduate education was slipping. Faculty 
believed this slippage was due, at least in part, by the physical culture requirement that 
was invariably tied to football (Lester, 1999). President Hutchins felt a reworking of the 
school‟s undergraduate curriculum was in order. Under the “New Plan” the physical 
culture requirement was abolished. This move was in contrast to the directions that other 
universities were moving. “By the mid 1930‟s, most American universities had 
developed a physical education major in response to required physical education in most 
school systems in America (Lester, 1999 p.137).” The changes instituted at Chicago to 
the curriculum made it harder for players to gain acceptance to the school.  These actions 
were legitimized with the school‟s acceptance of the “New Plan.” 
 Unlike President Harper, Hutchins was not trying to promote the academic 
reputation of the University of Chicago through its football program. By the time 
Hutchins was named president of the University of Chicago the school was widely 
considered a first rate academic institution.  It no longer needed (or wanted) a football 
program to enhance and promote the image of the school. Hutchins main argument was 
that athletics, particularly football, were inconsistent with the mission of the school. Said 
differently, by not connecting the visibility afforded football with promoting Harper 
vision of the school Hutchins had redefined the problem. If President Harper‟s plan was 
to use football to enhance and promote the school‟s academic reputation then Hutchins 
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reasoned that with that reputation intact then football was not needed. In fact, Hutchins 
believed that football and the physical culture requirements were hurting the school‟s 
undergraduate reputation. Hutchins had in fact redefined the problem of football at 
Chicago. 
Financial Condition of the Athletic Department 
 The decline of football was swift at the University of Chicago. Helping expedite this 
decline was the drastic dropping in gate receipts of the football program. “In 1925, 
Chicago led the Intercollegiate Conference (Big Ten) with net receipts of $248,867.13, it 
led again in 1926. Three seasons later, however, it ranked eighth, and as conference 
football receipts more than doubled from 1923 to 1929, those at Chicago dropped more 
than 50 percent from 1926 to 1929 (Lester, 1999),” This drastic reduction in revenues 
helped create a climate of doubt regarding the viability of football at the school. 
 The idea of football as a long term investment was dealt a blow when the 
administration decided not to invest in building a bigger stadium, but simply expand the 
existing facility. “Alumni supporters assumed that the stadium enlargement meant that 
the Chicago administration was dedicated to a heightened scale of football activity, but 
the truth lay elsewhere (Lester, 1999).” This move came at a time when rival schools 
were making strategic investments in their football stadiums as primary revenue sources. 
In deciding to enlarge the existing faculty but not build a brand new stadium, school 
administrators had made a calculating bet to keep alumni happy but also retain authority 
over football expenditures. The refusal of the university to build a stadium coincided 
with an era of unprecedented expenditures devoted to stadium construction by rival 
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universities. During this time period college football enjoyed its greatest growth period 
in history. Between 1921 and 1930, football “enjoyed a doubling of attendance and a 
trebling of total gate receipts, and the Intercollegiate Conference (Big Ten) may have 
experienced the most significant growth over this period of all groups (Lester, 1999).”  
 Football growth was especially prominent in Chicago. Although Chicago was a large 
city that had a strong history of supporting sports “an important factor in the university‟s 
rapid loss of the marketplace lay in the number of alternative games offered in the 
metropolitan area (Lester, 1999).” Among these alternative games being offered were 
from rivals Northwestern University, Notre Dame University and the University of 
Illinois, as well as the Chicago Bears of the newly created National Football League. 
 In 1939, university administrators discussed alternative courses of action regarding 
intercollegiate football including 1) hiring a new coach, 2) recruiting new players, 3) 
new opposition, 4) a new scale of participation, and 5) abrogation of the sport (Lester, 
1999). Each of these alternatives were discussed and debated. The first alternative was 
dismissed because the present coach, Clark Shaunessy, had tenure and was considered 
by all to be an excellent coach despite his record at the school.  The second alternative 
was not a viable option because the school refused to succumb to the recruiting tactics 
used by rival schools. The third alternative, to play lesser schools, was seriously 
discussed but President Hutchins did not like the idea of “diminishing Chicago‟s status 
as a premier university” by regularly scheduling non research based schools like Oberlin 
and Beloit (Lester, 1999 p.183). The fourth alternative that was discussed involved 
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playing an intramural schedule was considered unworkable and therefore dismissed. 
That left only the last alternative which was to abandoned football. 
 Hutchins was an educational puritan at heart and sharply disagreed with Stagg‟s 
stance regarding the importance of football. However, he was not naive about garnering 
political support for the move out of football. In the years leading up to the dropping of 
football in 1939, Hutchins made not so subtle attempts at garnering political support 
from key constituencies. This move was done to lessen the impact that the decision 
would have on key university stakeholders. One of these key stakeholders was 
University Trustee John Nuveen. Hutchins began courting Nuveen by “showering the 
other members of the board with memorabilia and antifootball literature; they included 
articles and editorials from the nations press (Lester, 1999).” 
 Another tactic used in the years leading up to 1939 by Hutchins was writing articles 
in leading publications expressing concern over the direction of intercollegiate athletics. 
These articles were distributed to the university‟s Board of Trustees. The articles along 
with Chicago‟s winless record eventually persuaded the board to go along with Hutchins 
recommendations. 
 Few activities are more institutionalized on a college campus that athletics. Within 
an athletic department few sports bring a campus together than football. Football is 
embedded in the fabric of most research institutions. Because of the growth of 
intercollegiate athletics, football has been the vehicle that most schools use to brand their 
institutions (Roy, Greaff, & Harmon, 2008). While this is less true at academically 
prestigious schools many of those schools, including Stanford, Northwestern, and Duke,  
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still play Division I athletics. Because of this, the decision to abolish football on an 
American campus involves much more than a president making a unilateral decision. 
 At the University of Chicago the financial condition of the athletic department 
played a key role in the de-institutionalization of the football program. If the football 
program at the school could not pay its own way then it relied on university funds. The 
decline of football was swift. Helping expedite this decline was the drastic dropping in 
gate receipts for football. This drastic reduction in revenues helped create a climate of 
doubt regarding the viability of football at the school. 
 The idea of football as a long term investment was dealt a blow when the 
administration decided not to invest in building a bigger stadium, but simply expanding 
the existing facility. This move came at a time when rival schools were making strategic 
investments in their football stadiums as primary revenue sources. In deciding to enlarge 
the existing faculty but not build a brand new stadium, school administrators had made a 
calculating bet to keep alumni happy but also retain authority over football expenditures. 
Chicago would have no argument for “sunk costs” of a new stadium to deter 
administrators when deciding the merits of continuing football at the school. 
Change in Coaches 
 It is clear from both the popular press and academic literature that Stagg‟s reputation 
and the escalation of football at Chicago are intertwined. During his tenure at Chicago, 
Stagg made many changes to the position of head coach. “Stagg‟s rise was due to his 
special relationship with Harper, his dominant personality, the precentless department 
that he headed, the innovative “profession” of coaching of which he was a pioneer, and 
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the enlargement of his national reputation based upon his unparalleled entrepreneurial 
and his football genius (Lester, 1999).” These changes were made with the idea of 
increasing his power base both inside and outside of the university. However, the culture 
changed when Hutchins became president. 
 With the appointment of President Hutchins came a reexamining of athletics at the 
University of Chicago campus. President Hutchins and the faculty never quite accepted 
the arrangement that Harper had with Stagg and athletics. Prior to stepping down as 
Chicago‟s coach Stagg wrote a letter to President Hutchins. In this letter Stagg writes “I 
may be frank in saying that I have often felt that, in fairness to myself, I should resign 
from the University and take a position where I would have a favorable chance to recoup 
the loss in prestige which I have suffered as a football coach (Lester, 1999 p.148)” After 
failing to come to an agreement with Hutchins on a proper position for himself at the 
University, Stagg resigned and later accepted the head football coaching job at the 
University of Pacific in Stockton, California. 
 After Stagg‟s departure to the University of Pacific, the University of Chicago‟s 
football program declined dramatically. Hutchins stated that “unless the football team 
wins a fair proportion of its games, it does not serve as a rallying point for the 
undergraduates (Murphy & Bruckner, 1976 p.223).” As spectator interest in the program 
declined so did the talent recruited to the school. The coach that followed Stagg, Clark 
Shaughnessy, watched as the school gradually lost ground to its conference rivals. 
 In 1939, Hutchins de-emphasized athletics and officially abolished intercollegiate 
football at the University of Chicago. Lawson & Ingham (1980) state that the withdrawal 
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from football competition was but one more indication that the University of Chicago 
“regarded education as a serious occupation for serious people, and not as recreation and 
punishment for the immature (p.58).” Seven years later the school would withdraw all its 
other sports from the Big Ten conference before reinstating Division III non scholarship 
football in 1969. 
 It was clear to all parties involved that the resignation of Stagg dealt football at the 
University of Chicago a blow. From a prestige standpoint, the university was left without 
their most famous spokesperson. For years Stagg and the university had been 
synonymous with football success from both a local and national perspective. The 
research conducted for this paper indicated that even with a change in presidents the 
abolishment of football would not have happened without a change in coaches. Keil and 
Robey (1999) state that “when project champions leave, or are removed, it is often easier 
for commitments to be reassessed and de-escalated (p.68).” In this case, Stagg served as 
a champion for football at the university. Stagg‟s predecessor was never able to win 
support of the administration. 
Discussion 
 As discussed, de-escalation is a four part process (Montealegre & Keil, 2000). This 
process – problem recognition, re-examination of prior course of action, search for 
alternative course of action, and implementing an exit strategy - has become the model 
for better understanding de-escalation within organizational theory. This section will be 
used to examine the findings/analysis of the case and tie it to Montealegre & Keil‟s 
(2000) model that is outlined in the introduction chapter. 
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 The change in presidents at the University of Chicago brought the need to both 
recognize there was a problem with intercollegiate athletics at the school and the chance 
to reexamine the prior course of action taken by President Harper. As noted earlier, a 
reexamination of prior course of action is part of Montealegre & Keil (2000) four phase 
de-escalation model. In the beginning, athletics offered a chance for the university to 
promote its growing reputation. This was done by hiring excellent faculty and using 
Stagg‟s success on the football field to help the university brand itself as a first rate 
institution. However, when Hutchins became president, the University of Chicago was 
well established as a prominent school in the country. Indeed, Hutchins felt that the 
undergraduate curriculum was being hindered by athletes that were underperforming in 
the classroom. This led the University of Chicago to search for alternative courses of 
action regarding their football program. 
 Montealagre & Keil (2000) note that one of the phases of de-escalation involves 
searching for an alternative course for action. Prior to abolishing football, the school 
administrators searched for ways that athletics and academics could coexist at the school 
before ultimately deciding to drop the sport. However, before deciding to end football 
President Hutchins need to put in place an exit strategy that would ensure that the school 
was successful in this move despite strong opposition. 
 The removal of Amos Alonzo Stagg from the university was a central part of 
Hutchins overall exit strategy. Readers will note that the implementation of an exit 
strategy is the fourth phase of Montealagre & Keil (2000) de-escalation model. Stagg, 
who had built a loyal following both at the school and around the nation, was strongly 
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against the move to abolish football. Hutchins, to his credit, understood that he would 
never be able to enact this change as long as Stagg was at the school. In essence, the 
removal of Stagg was the first part in Hutchins exit strategy. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
To this day the question remains: Did the University of Chicago make the right 
decision to abandoned Division I athletics?  Private schools like Duke University, 
Vanderbilt University, and Stanford University are first class academic institutions that 
also participate in Division I athletics. Proof they note that schools can maintain tough 
academic requirements and still play intercollegiate athletics at the highest level. 
William H. McNeill, distinguished professor emeritus and noted antifootball critic noted 
in his book entitled Hutchins’ University (1991): 
Of all the actions Robert Maynard Hutchins took in his twenty years as 
president of the  University of Chicago, the abolition of intercollegiate 
football, announced in December 1939, provoked the loudest reaction, both 
among alumni and across the country….Football overshadowed everything 
else, and the university‟s popular reputation as a place where radical intellect 
had snuffed out red-blooded, all-American games became an unhappy 
counterpoint to (William) Benton‟s celebration of the university‟s cultural 
and public roles. In retrospect, it is clear that withdrawal from big time 
football involved significant loss for the university… The loss for the 
university was and remains real (Lester, 1995 p.197). 
 
McNeill‟s comments highlight the fact that at the University of Chicago, like most 
higher education institutions there is diversity of opinions regarding athletics, 
particularly football.  Perhaps at a school like the University of Chicago with its rigorous 
study football could have served as a necessary counterbalance. The abolishment of 
football at the university does not acknowledge that athletics can be used as promotional 
tool for the university. 
Hutchins muffed a chance to continue Harper‟s tradition of pioneering in sports 
and cashing in on the public attention football commanded; and the student body 
lost the chance of supplementing their superior intellectual prowess with a more 
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visceral but very valuable sort of collective identity, based on association with 
famous athletes and cheering them on – thus associating themselves and the 
whole university with another, quite genuine kind of excellence (Lester, 1999 
p.197) 
 
 Although Hutchins decision to abandon football will always be second guessed they 
can be little argument that today, years after the decision to abandon football, the 
University of Chicago remains one of the top research universities in the country. Critics 
can argue that there are highly selective and academically prestigious schools that 
compete in Division I athletics and indeed that is true, however, it deserves mentioning 
that there are academically prestigious schools that struggle to compete with large state 
supported universities. 
 Another question that deserves attention is whether or not this type of decision could 
be enacted in today‟s college athletics environment. With the increased media attention 
that the revenue sports – football and basketball – generate the answer would likely be 
no. If a school president or board of trustees were to abolish or reclassify athletics there 
would be tremendous media exposure placed on the school. The majority of this media 
exposure would certainly be negative in nature as was the case with Birmingham 
Southern College. When President Gordon Gee abolished the athletic department (but 
continued Division I athletics) at Vanderbilt University he was attacked as an 
administrator that did not take athletics seriously. As a reminder, Hutchins faced 
tremendous negative media exposure even before the advent of television for his 
decision to abolish football at the University of Chicago. In an age when most 
universities operate in a political environment this would create what most campus 
administrators would consider to be unneeded attention on the school. 
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 The larger question pertains to the extent to which universities use their athletic 
program‟s success to promote the broader mission of the school, which is, arguably, 
academic excellence. As an example, some would assert that the University of Notre 
Dame has used the visibility brought by football‟s on the field success to promote the 
school‟s academic mission. Today, Notre Dame is the flagship Catholic university in the 
country. A designation many credit at least in part due to football‟s success. I believe 
that is an isolated case and would argue that a school‟s academic mission and their 
athletic department are separate functions that have little correlation with each other. The 
research presented in the University of Chicago case shows that while the school initially 
used the football program to promote academics the abolishment of the sport has 
certainly not hurt the institutions academic reputation. 
 It deserves mentioning that few athletic departments operate without subsidies from 
the university (Fulk, 2009). Often, these subsidies come in the form of increased student 
fees or from the university‟s central fund. As universities struggle to provide a 
meaningful education while maintaining reasonable tuition costs greater attention is paid 
to how a school allocates their financial resources. As the costs continue to rise for 
schools that try and compete at the Division I level campus administrators at these 
institutions are going to make hard decisions regarding the role intercollegiate athletics 
plays on their campuses. This is especially true at private institutions that often do not 
have the financial resources to compete with large state schools and are typically more 
selective in the students they admit. This made the decision at the University of Chicago 
a unique case to study. As the delineation continues in Division I athletics between 
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schools that are willing to engage in escalating athletic budgets and those that do not 
have the financial resources to do so it looks like Hutchins decision was not only 
courageous but correct. 
121 
 
REFERENCES 
Aaker, D. A. (1996). Building strong brands. New York: Free Press. 
Allison, G. T. (1971). Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston, 
MA: Little, Brown. 
Arkes, H. R., & Blumer, C. (1985). The psychology of sunk cost. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 35, 124-140. 
Barr, C. (2008). College Sport. In L. Masteralexis (Ed.), Principles and practice of sport 
management (pp.145-166). Boston: Jones and Bartlett Publishers.  
Baty, T. (2008). June Jones‟ hiring is a mistake: Here‟s why. Hilltopics, 4(7) 1-4.  
Baxter, V. & Lambert, C. (1990). The national collegiate athletic association and the 
governance of higher education. The Sociological Quarterly, 31(3), 403-421. 
Berkowitz, S. (2009). Athletic Directors recommending NCAA cost cuts 
 USA Today 10/27/2009 
Beyer, J. M., & Hannah, D. R. (2000). The cultural significance of athletics in U.S. 
higher education. Journal of Sport Management, 14, 105-132. 
Brockner, J., Nathanson, S., Friend, A., Harbeck, J., Samuelson, C., Houser, R., 
Bazerman, M. H., & Rubin, J. Z. (1984). The role of modeling processes in the 
“knee deep in the big muddy” phenomenon. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Performance, 33, 77-99. 
Brockner, J., & Rubin, J. Z. (1985). Entrapment in escalating conflicts. New York: 
Springer-Verlag. 
122 
 
Brockner, J., Rubin, J. Z., & Lang, E. (1981). Face-saving and entrapment. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 17, 68-79. 
Buchanan, O. (2008). SMU hopes lightning strikes twice with Jones. Rivals.com 
2/12/2008. Retrieved from 
http://collegefootball.rivals.com/content.asp?CID=773377 
Byers, W. (1995). Unsportsmanlike conduct: Exploiting college athletics. 
 Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 
Certo, S. T., Connelly, B.L., & Tihanyi, L. (2008). Managers and their not so rational 
decisions. Business Horizons, 51, 113-119 
Cohen, A. (1998). The shaping of American higher education. San Francisco: John 
Wiley & Sons 
Cole, P. & Wagnon, B. (2007). Are you ready for some football?   
Southern: The Official Publication of Birmingham Southern College. Summer 
Colon, R. (2009). Old schools, new football programs. Fftoolbox.com  
Sept. 6, 2009. Retrieved from 
http://www.fftoolbox.com/college-football/article.cfm?article_id=14 
DeFord, F. (2007). Birmingham Southern chose students over athletes Sports 
Illustrated.com January 10, 2007. Retrieved from 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/writers/frank_deford/01/10/birmingham.sou
thern/ 
Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y. (1994). Entering the field of qualitative research. In N.K. 
  Denzin & Y. Lincoln (Eds.) Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 1-17). 
123 
 
  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Drummond, H. (1994). Too little too late: A case study of escalation in decision making. 
Organization Studies. 15 (4) 591-607.  
Drummond, H. (1995). De-escalation in decision making: A case of a disastrous  
  partnership. Journal of Management Studies, 32, 265-281. 
Drummond, H. (1996) Escalation in decision making. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
DuBois, P. (2008). Concerning initiation of an intercollegiate football program at UNC 
Charlotte. Retrieved from http://administration.uncc.edu/Outbox 
/Final%20Football%20Statement.pdf. 
Erlandson, D. (1993). Doing naturalistic inquiry: A guide to methods. Newbury 
  Park, CA. Sage.  
Equity in Athletics Data Analysis (2010). The equity in athletics data analysis cutting 
tool. U. S. Department of Education. Retrieved from http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/ 
Fielding, N. & Fielding, J. (1986). Linking data: The articulation of qualitative and  
  quantitative methods in social research. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Flowers, R. (2007). Win one for the gipper: Organizational foundations of  
  intercollegiate athletics. Journal for the Study of Sports and Athletics 
  In Education 1(2) 121-140.  
Fox F. V., & Staw, B. M. (1979). The trapped administrator: Effects of job insecurity 
and policy resistance upon commitment to a course of action. Administration 
Science Quarterly. 24, 449-471. 
124 
 
Frank, R. H. (2004). Challenging the myth: A review of the links among college athletic 
success, student quality, and donations. Knight Foundation Commission on 
Intercollegiate Athletics. Retrieved from www.knightcommission.com. 
Fulks, D. (2009). Revenue and expenses of Division I & II intercollegiate athletics 
programs report. Indianapolis, IN: The National Collegiate Athletic Association. 
Gelb, M., & Ramsey, E. (2008). The cost of losing: Athletics has survived football‟s 
decline so far. Can it continue? The Daily Orange, Sept. 11, 2008. 
Glesne, C. (1999). Becoming qualitative researchers: An introduction. New York: 
Longman 
Goff, B. (2000). Effects of university athletics on the university: A review and extension 
of empirical assessment. Journal of Sport Management, 14, 85-104. 
Goff, B. & Ashwell, T. (2008). College Sport. In L. Masteralexis (Ed.), Principles and 
practice of sport management (pp.386-411). Boston: Jones and Bartlett 
Publishers. 
Goodman, P. S., Bazerman, M. H., & Conlon, E. J. (1980). Institutionalization processes 
in organizational change. In B. M. Staw & L. L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in 
organizational behavior (Vol. 2). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Hearn, T. (2002). The culture of sport and the future of intercollegiate athletics 
association of governing boards. Address to the Association of Governing 
Boards, Boston, MA. 
125 
 
Judson, K. M., Gorchels, L., & Aurand, T. W. (2006) Building a university brand from 
within: A comparison of coaches‟ perspectives of internal branding. Journal of 
Marketing for Higher Education, 16, 97-114. 
Keil, M. & Robey, D. (1999). Turning around troubled software projects: An exploratory 
study of the de-escalation of commitment of failing courses of action. Journal of 
Management Information Systems 15 (4), 63-87. 
Knight Commission (2001). A call to action: Reconnecting college sports and higher 
 education. Retrieved from http://www.knightcommission.org/ 
Knox, R., & Inkster, J., (1969). Post decision dissonance at Post Time. 
  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8, 318-323 
Lawlor, J. (1998). Brand identity. Case Currents, 24, 16-23. 
Lawrence, P. (1987). Unsportsmanlike conduct: The NCAA and the business of college 
  football. New York: Praeger Press. 
Lawson, H. & Ingham, A. (1980). Conflicting ideologies concerning the university and  
  Intercollegiate athletics: Harper and Hutchins at Chicago, 1892-1940. Journal 
  Of Sport History, 7 (3), 37-67. 
Lester, R. (1999). Stagg’s University: The rise, decline, and fall of big time football 
  at Chicago. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
Lincoln, Y. & Guba, E. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. New York: Sage. 
Lipshitz, R. (1995). The road to desert storm. Organization Studies, 16, 243-263. 
March, J. G. (1978). Bounded rationality, ambiguity, and the engineering of choice. Bell 
Journal of Economics, 9, 587-608. 
126 
 
Mattox, B. (2009). ASU to close academic programs. The state press.com 2/10/2009. 
Retrieved from http://www.statepress.com/archive/node/4260 
McGill, A. (1998). SMU‟s $350 million gamble. D Magazine. Retrieved from 
http://www.dmagazine.com/Home/1998/01/01/SPECIAL_REPORT_SMUs_350
_Million_GAMBLE.aspx 
McNeill, W. (1991). Hutchins’ University: A memoir of the University of Chicago. 
  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Meyer, M. W., & Zucker, L. G. (1989). Permanently failing organizations. Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage. 
Mitchell, T. R., Holtom, B. C., Lee, T. W., Sablynski, C. J., & Erez, M. (2001) Why 
people stay: Using job embeddedness to predict voluntary turnover. Academy of 
Management Journal, 44, 1102-1121. 
Montealegre, R. & Keil, M. (2000). De-escalating information technology projects: 
Lessons from the Denver International Airport. MIS Quarterly, 24, 417-447. 
Murphy, W. & Bruckner, D. (1976). The idea of the University of Chicago: Selections 
from the papers of the first eight chief executives of the University of Chicago. 
 Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
NACUBO Endowment Study. (2009). National Association of College and University 
Business Officers. Retrieved from http://www.nacubo.org/Products/Online_ 
Research/2008_NACUBO_Endowment_Study.html. 
Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of 
social judgment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
127 
 
Northcraft, G. B., & Neale, M. A. (1986). Opportunity costs and the framing of resource 
allocation decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 
37, 348-356. 
Patton, M.Q. (1980). Qualitative evaluation methods. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Patton, M.Q. (2002). Qualitative research & evaluation methods. Thousand Oaks, CA. 
 Sage. 
Pfeffer, J. (1981). Power in organizations. Marchfield, MA: Pitman Publishing. 
Platt, J. (1973). Social traps. American Psychologist, 28, 641-651. 
Powers, E. (2007). Tracking a move away from Division I 
  Inside Higher Ed. 9/5/2007. Retrieved from 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/09/05/bsu 
Putler, D. S., & Wolfe, R. A. (1999). Perceptions of intercollegiate athletics programs: 
Priorities and tradeoffs. Sociology of Sport Journal, 16, 301-325. 
Rice University Study of Intercollegiate Athletics (2004) McKinsey Consulting for Rice  
  University Board of Trustees Athletics Subcommittee.  
Ries, A. & Trout, J (1981). Positioning: The battle for your mind. McGraw Hill 
Ross, J. (2003). Avoiding Captain Ahabs: Lessons from the office of independent 
counsel. Administration & Society, 35, 334-349. 
Ross, J., & Staw, B. M. (1986). Expo 86: An escalation prototype. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 31, 274-297. 
Ross, J., & Staw, B. M. (1993). Organizational escalation and exit: Lessons from the 
Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant. Academy of Management Journal, 36, 701-732. 
128 
 
Roy, D., Graeff, T., & Harmon, S. (2008). Repositioning a university through NCAA 
Division I-A football membership. Journal of Sport Management, 22, 11-29. 
Rubin, H. & Rubin, I. (2005). Qualitative Interviewing: The art of hearing the data. 
 Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Schwandt, T. A. (2001). Qualitative inquiry: A dictionary of terms. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
Shimizu, K. & Hitt, M. A. (2005). What constraints or facilitates divestitures of formerly 
acquired firms? The Journal of Management, 31, 50-72  
Shulman, J. & Bowen, W. (2001). The game of life. Princeton: University Press. 
Simonson, I., & Staw, B. (1992). Deescalation strategies: A comparison of techniques 
 for reducing commitment to losing courses of Action. Journal of Applied 
 Psychology 77, 419-426.  
Southern Methodist University (2007). June Jones named head football coach at SMU. 
1/7/2007. Retrieved from http://smu.edu/newsinfo/stories/june-jones-
7jan2008.asp 
Soy, S. (1997). The case study as a research method. Unpublished paper 
 University of Texas. 
Sperber, M. (2000). Beer and circus: How big-time college sports is crippling 
undergraduate education. New York: Holt Paperbacks. 
Stake, R. E. (1995). The art of case study research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
129 
 
Staw, B. M. (1976). Knee deep in the big muddy: A study of escalating commitment to a 
chosen course of action. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 16, 
27-44. 
Staw, B. M. (1981). The escalation of commitment to a course of action. Academy of 
Management Review, 6, 577-587. 
Staw, B. & Ross, J. (1987). Knowing when to pull the plug. Harvard Business Review 
 March 01, 1987 
Staw, B. M. (2005). The escalation of commitment: Steps toward an organizational 
theory. In K. G. Smith & M. A. Hitt (Eds.), Great minds in management (pp. 
215–238). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Staw, B. M., & Ross, J. (1980). Commitment in an experimenting society: An 
experiment on the attribution of leadership form administrative scenarios. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 65, 249-260. 
Staw, B. M., & Ross, J. (1987). Behavior in escalation situations: Antecedents, 
prototypes, and solutions. Research in Organizational Behavior, 9, 39-78. 
Staw, B. M., & Ross, J. (1989). Understanding behavior in escalation situations. Science, 
246, 216-220. 
Stephens, K. (2009). UTSA introduces Larry Coker as first football coach. UTSA Today. 
Retrieved on December 8, 2009 from 
http://www.utsa.edu/today/2009/03/coker.cfm. 
Sutton, J. (1991). Sunk costs and market structure: Price competition, advertising, and 
the evolution of concentration. Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press. 
130 
 
Schwandt, T. A. (1997). Qualitative inquiry: A dictionary of terms. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
Storr, R. (1966). Harper’s University: The beginnings; a history of the University of 
Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Teger, A. (1980). Too much invested to quit. New York: Wiley Press. 
Thelin, J. (1994). Games colleges play: Scandal and reform in Intercollegiate Athletics. 
 Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Thomas, K. (2009). The role of student fees in athletic budgets. The New York Times 
College Sports Blog. Retrieved on November 18, 2009 from 
http://thequad.blogs.nytimes.com /2009/11/18/the-role-of-student-fees-in-
athletic-budgets. 
Toma, J. & Cross, M. (1996). Intercollegiate athletics and student college choice. 
 ASHE annual meeting paper. 
Tulane University. (2003). Report of the President. Retrieved on December 3, 2009 from 
http:// pres2003.tulane.edu/home.html. 
U.S. News and World Report (2010). Annual college rankings. 
Waugh, S. (2009). Provost Scott Waugh outlines next budget steps for UCLA. UCLA 
Today. Retrieved on November 8, 2009 from 
http://www.today.ucla.edu/portal/ut/PRN-provost-scott-waugh-outlines-next-
95270.aspx. 
Yin, R. K. (1984). Case study research: design and methods. Newbury Park, CA. Sage. 
131 
 
Yin, R. K. (2003). Case study research: Design and methods (3rd ed.). Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage. 
Zimbalist, A. (1999). Unpaid professionals: Commercialism and conflict in big time 
college sports. Princeton: University Press.
132 
 
APPENDIX 
INITIAL QUESTIONS ASKED BY INTERVIEWER 
 When did participating in Division I athletics cease to be a good idea? 
 What factors contributed to your individual institution‟s decision to continue playing 
Division I athletics? 
 What participation did the Board of Trustees play in the decision making process? 
 Who disagrees with you regarding the direction of intercollegiate athletics at this 
institution?  
 What is the annual budget for the athletic department? 
 How much influence did athletic department stakeholders play in continuing to 
participate in Division I athletics? 
 Discuss the schools endowment and branding initiatives as they related to the 
schools athletic status?  
 Did participating in Division I have an impact on enrollment? 
 How do universities stop or reposition their athletic department once it becomes 
clear that they are headed in down a path of escalation of commitment?  
 What was the most difficult part of leaving Division I?  
 Discuss the political aspects of staying (or moving) in Division I? 
 What was the thought process in participating in Division I? 
 Where is the relationship between the faculty and the athletic department?  
 Where did the President and the Board of Trustees stand regarding athletics?  
 When did participating in Division I athletics cease to be a good idea? 
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 What factors contributed to your individual institution‟s decision to continue playing 
Division I athletics? 
 What participation did the Board of Trustees play in the decision making process?  
 Who disagrees with you regarding the direction of intercollegiate athletics at this 
institution? 
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